Intracompany Governance and Innovation by Sharon Belenzon et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES










We thank Liat Oren for invaluable assistance with the programming of the ownership algorithm and
Hadar Gafni for excellent research assistance. We also thank Luca Enriques, Daniel Ferreira, Ronald
Gilson, Joshua Lerner, Randall Morck, Daniel Paravisini, Katharina Pistor, David Robinson, John
Van Reenen and Daniel Wolfenzon for helpful comments. All remaining errors are our own. The views
expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National
Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2009 by Sharon Belenzon, Tomer Berkovitz, and Patrick Bolton. All rights reserved. Short sections
of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full
credit, including © notice, is given to the source.Intracompany Governance and Innovation
Sharon Belenzon, Tomer Berkovitz, and Patrick Bolton




This paper examines the relation between ownership, corporate form, and innovation for a cross-section
of private and publicly traded innovating firms in the US and 15 European countries. A striking novel
observation emerges from our analysis: while most innovating firms in the US are publicly traded
conglomerates, a substantial fraction of innovation is concentrated in private firms and in business
groups in continental European countries. We find virtually no variation across US industries in the
corporate form of innovating firms, but a substantial variation across industries in continental European
countries, where business groups tend to be concentrated in industries with a slower and more fundamental
innovation cycle and where intellectual protection of innovators seems to be of paramount importance.
Our findings suggest that innovative companies choose the corporate form most conducive to R&D,
as predicted by the Coasian view of how firms form. This is especially true in Europe, where there
are fewer regulatory hurdles to the formation of business groups and hybrid corporate forms. It is less
the case in the US, where conglomerates are generally favored.
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Which corporate forms are most propitious to innovation? Is it standalone ￿rms ￿nanced by
Venture Capital (VC)? Is it conglomerate incubators, or looser business-group and corporate
alliance structures? While GE, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, DuPont or 3M are often mentioned
as examples of highly innovative conglomerate ￿rms in the U.S., there have also been many
prominent examples of VC-backed standalones in recent years, such as Amazon, Netscape, or
Google. Although VC-backed innovation has been less important in Europe, innovative activity
in conglomerates such as Philips or Nokia is highly visible, and business-groups in the vein of
Ericsson, Zeiss, Alstom and Novartis are also renowned innovators.
Economists and business scholars have pointed to the advantages of conglomerates in fund-
ing R&D projects with cheaper internally generated funds (Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein,
1994 and Stein, 1997) while at the same time emphasizing the dark side of internal capital
markets, in terms of reduced ￿nancial discipline for poorly performing investments (Scharf-
stein and Stein, 2000). Seru (2007) ￿nds evidence consistent with this dark side of internal
capital markets: publicly traded U.S. conglomerates with above-average reallocation of funds
across divisions are less productive innovators than comparable stand-alone ￿rms. Similarly,
Guedj and Scharfstein (2004) compare clinical trials in the biopharmaceutical industry and ￿nd
that big pharmaceuticals ￿rms engaged in cancer research tend to initiate too many studies
but are quicker to terminate unpromising research than smaller (stand-alone) biotech ￿rms.
In contrast, Belenzon and Berkovitz (2008a) ￿nd European evidence that innovation tends to
be concentrated in business-groups and that business-group a¢ liates tend to engage in more
innovation than comparable stand-alone ￿rms.
While these studies do not necessarily o⁄er contradictory evidence - as business-groups have
a di⁄erent governance structure than fully integrated conglomerates - they do suggest that the
link between governance and innovation is likely to be complex and that more systematic
evidence is required to have a better understanding on how governance a⁄ects innovation.
2In this paper we o⁄er a more complete picture of the link between governance and innovation
by looking at a cross-section of innovating ￿rms in the U.S. and in 15 European countries. In
addition, we provide a broad conceptual framework that allows us to compare the relative
strengths of standalone ￿rms, conglomerates and business-groups in fostering innovation.
Building on existing theories of conglomerate internal capital markets, we emphasize the
relative strengths of conglomerates in terms of cheaper internal R&D funding, better winner-
picking, and lower stigma of failure, versus the stronger intellectual property rights for innova-
tors in stand-alone ￿rms.1 Business-groups occupy a middle ground compared with conglomer-
ates and standalones. These are fuzzier and more diverse organizational forms with potentially
complex controlling stakes holding together a set of independently incorporated companies.
Business groups may be entirely composed of privately held entities or may combine both
privately held and publicly traded companies. Business groups may take the form of pyrami-
dal structures, where a single controlling company has direct or indirect controlling stakes in
multiple subsidiary companies, or business alliances, where the companies in the alliance are
connected through interlocking stakes.
Business groups are rare in the U.S. and somewhat rare in the U.K., but they are om-
nipresent elsewhere in the world. Business groups have been associated with poor minority
investor protection and ine¢ cient rent extraction by controlling shareholders (see Johnson, La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2000, and Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan, 2002).
They are often seen as a consequence of poor legal investor protections in emerging market
countries, and also to some extent in developed ￿ civil law￿countries. Accordingly, we model
business groups as in Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) and allow for ine¢ cient diversion of funds
by controlling shareholders from ￿rms a¢ liated with a business group. Due to this ine¢ cient
diversion business groups involve greater ine¢ ciencies than conglomerates or standalones, other
things equal. However, business groups also have strengths in terms of cheaper internal R&D
funding and a lower stigma of failure relative to stand-alone ￿rms, as well as strengths in terms
1We mainly build on Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein (1994), Stein (1997) and Scharfstein and Stein (2000).
3of stronger intellectual property rights for innovators relative to conglomerates.
An important basic premise of our analysis is that innovating ￿rms tend to set up their
corporate governance to implement an e¢ cient environment to foster innovation. Thus, when
the observed choice of corporate form is a conglomerate or a business group we assume that
this is the revealed preferred choice of organization. In other words, a basic premise of our
analysis is a Coasian perspective on ￿rm organization. Thus, to the extent that a particular
corporate form is especially well suited for innovative activities, we expect this corporate form
to be more prevalent among innovative ￿rms in a given industry than among non-innovating
￿rms.
We base our analysis on a comprehensive data-set of both private and publicly traded
American and European ￿rms, and match all corporate patents granted by the United States
Patent and Trademark O¢ ce (USPTO) and the European Patent O¢ ce (EPO) to these ￿rms.
We also single out ￿rms that publish their research in academic journals. We have thus identi￿ed
about 64.000 ￿rms that hold at least one patent from the EPO or USPTO, or have published at
least one scienti￿c article in a science journal. Of these 64.000 ￿rms, about 60% are American,
11% German, 8% British, 4% French, and 5% are Italian. We matched 880.000 USPTO, 615.000
EPO patents, and 205.000 scienti￿c publications. 75% of USPTO patents and close to 40% of
EPO patents are held by American corporation. Germany appears to be the most innovative
European country while holding 12% and 20% of USPTO and EPO patents, respectively.
For scienti￿c publications, about 70% of the articles are published by U.S. corporations, 10%
German, and 3% French and British.
Several surprising ￿ndings emerge from our analysis. First and foremost, while the overall
distribution of USPTO patents by ownership structure in the whole sample is 18% standalones,
74% conglomerates, and 8% business-group a¢ liates, in the U.S. this distribution is skewed
towards standalones and conglomerates, with 20% and 76% respectively of patents falling in
these categories, and only 4% of patents being held by business group a¢ liates. In Europe,
on the other hand, 20% of the patents are held by business-group a¢ liates, and 11% and 68%
4respectively are held by standalones and conglomerates. A similar pattern emerges for EPO
patents and scienti￿c publications. There is also a wide variation in organizational form across
European countries. While Germany appears to resemble the U.S. in terms of concentration
of innovation in conglomerates (80%), French and Italian ￿rms are clearly skewed towards
business-group a¢ liates, with only 35% and 22% respectively of their patents being held by
conglomerates.
Second, we distinguish between business-group a¢ liates that are wholly-owned by their
parent company, which are more likely to be fully integrated, and a¢ liates that have minority
shareholders. The presence of minority shareholders in an a¢ liate company establishes a sepa-
ration between the a¢ liate and its parent company in terms of retained pro￿ts, patent holdings,
and resource reallocation. Business groups with partially owned a¢ liates are therefore more
decentralized corporate structures. Remarkably, in France 20% of innovation takes place in
a¢ liates with minority shareholders, while only 1% of innovation takes place in such a¢ liates
in the U.S. and Great Britain.
Third, the U.S. distribution of innovating ￿rms is also heavily skewed towards publicly
traded ￿rms. Indeed, the fraction of patents held by publicly traded American corporations is
above 60%, while this fraction is only about 40% in Europe. In some large European countries
this picture is even more extreme. In France, only 9% and 18% of USPTO and EPO patents,
respectively, are held by publicly traded ￿rms, while in Italy these ￿gures drop to as low as 3%
and 7% respectively. Also, publicly traded innovating ￿rms in Europe are more likely to belong
to a business group, with more than 40% of innovating listed ￿rms belonging to a business-
group in France and Germany, compared with only 2% and 1% respectively in the U.S. and
Great Britain.
Fourth, we ￿nd a substantial variation in organization structure across industries. Business
groups tend to be concentrated in industries where innovation takes a longer time, is more un-
certain, but has a higher payo⁄when it succeeds (such as pharmaceuticals and biotechnology).
These innovative activities may be more vulnerable to hold-up problems and require greater
5protection of the intellectual property rights of the innovator. In contrast, conglomerates are
more prevalent in industries with rapid, incremental, innovations (such as computer hardware
and telecommunications) where the ability of conglomerates to identify the relevant innova-
tion and to quickly redeploy assets may give this organizational form an edge over business
groups. We ￿nd that European ￿rms are strongly skewed towards business groups in the latter
industries, while U.S. innovating ￿rms take the conglomerate form in more or less the same
proportion across all industries.
Our ￿ndings are broadly consistent with a Coasian view on ￿rm organization form, which
is to say that ￿rms choose the corporate form that is best suited for fostering innovative activ-
ities. The alternative view in the literature is that organization form is chosen by entrenched
managers, or controlling shareholders, to suit their best interests at the expense of minority
shareholders and overall ￿rm e¢ ciency. By this latter view it is not obvious that one should
see any systematic di⁄erence in organization form in a given industry and country across inno-
vative and non-innovative ￿rms. We examine whether innovative ￿rms are disproportionately
represented in a given organization category, using sales of about 3.5 million ￿rms as our
benchmark. We ￿nd that innovation is disproportionately concentrated in business-groups
in the pharmaceuticals industry, and disproportionately concentrated in conglomerates in the
telecommunications industry. This pattern is especially true in Europe, where there are fewer
regulatory hurdles to the formation of business groups and hybrid corporate forms. It is not
the case in the U.S., where conglomerates are generally preferred.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
framework, section 3 overviews the data, section 4 reports the main empirical ￿ndings and
section 5 concludes.
2. A Simple Model
We set up a model with at least two business units, which can be stand-alone entities, divisions
in a conglomerate ￿rm, or units linked in a business group, with one parent company owning
6a controlling block in a separately incorporated ￿rm.
1.Technological Assumptions
There are N ￿ 2 business units with liquid assets Wi ￿ 0 and a new R&D project. The
R&D project has ￿xed costs f > 0 at date 1 and a probability of success ￿(a) at date 2.
The probability of success depends on how well the project is managed, or more formally, on
which action a 2 f0;1g the project￿ s manager chooses. The project￿ s value to the business
unit conditional on success is given by v(a) > 0. A successful R&D project may also generate
spillovers to other business units worth s(a) ￿ 0. When the research is unsuccessful (with
probability (1 ￿ ￿(a))) it yields no ￿nancial return.
The project brings expected private bene￿ts or costs to the managerial team undertaking
it. The bene￿ts may come in the form of improved human capital and knowledge, better future
career prospects, enhanced reputation in the event of success. The costs may be the stigma
of failure when the research is not successful. Without loss of generality we normalize the net
bene￿ts arising from simply undertaking the project to zero. We denote by b > 0 the private
bene￿ts that come with success and by   > 0 the private costs associated with the stigma of
failure.
We shall assume that:
b￿1 ￿  (1 ￿ ￿1) < b￿0 ￿  (1 ￿ ￿0);
so that the expected net private bene￿ts to the manager are highest when the manager chooses
a = 0. Note that the latter inequality reduces to
(b +  )(￿0 ￿ ￿1) > 0;
and therefore holds if and only if ￿￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿0 < 0: We also assume that
(v1 + b)￿1 ￿  (1 ￿ ￿1) ￿ f > 0 > (v0 + b)￿0 ￿  (1 ￿ ￿0) ￿ f
These inequalities together with ￿￿ < 0 mean that the innovative activity is equivalent to
taking a higher risk, higher expected payo⁄ actions. In other words, R&D activities are high
7risk, but also high reward activities. The above inequalities also mean that the R&D activity
is worth undertaking if and only if the manager can be induced to choose the high risk, high
reward, action a = 1.
To simplify the analysis we also restrict attention to parameter values such that b￿1 ￿
 (1￿￿1). The manager￿ s expected private costs from the stigma of failure when he chooses a = 1
are then greater than the private bene￿ts from a successful innovation. Under this assumption
the manager has to receive some form of ￿nancial incentive to be willing to undertake the risky
innovative activity.
2.Governance Assumptions and Firm boundaries
We distinguish between three main types of ￿rms: standalones, conglomerates (with wholly-
owned a¢ liates) and business-groups with a¢ liates owned in part by minority shareholders.
A standalone ￿rm is essentially a ￿rm with a single business unit. Such a ￿rm is run
by a manager with an equity stake su¢ cient to align incentives and is monitored by a large
blockholder, venture capitalist (VC), or creditor, who plays the role of an active monitor as in
Holmstrom and Tirole (1994). A standalone ￿rm is viable only if it is able to raise su¢ cient
funds to ￿nance the research, while preserving the manager￿ s incentives to conduct the research
and the monitor￿ s incentive to monitor.
We assume that only a fraction ￿ of the ￿rm￿ s value v(a) can be pledged to raise external
funds. The parameter ￿ 2 (0;1) represents the fraction of R&D cash-￿ ow that is capitalizable
by the ￿rm. It provides a simple measure of the ￿nancial development of a country. The
higher is ￿ the more ￿nancially developed a country is. We assume that capital markets are
perfectly competitive for the pledgeable part of ￿rm value and for simplicity we normalize the
equilibrium required risk-adjusted return to zero.
Following Holmstrom and Tirole (1994) we also assume that the timing of the contractual
relation between investors in the ￿rm, the VC monitor, and the entrepreneur is as follows:
1. following an injection of funds in the ￿rm by investors, the monitor moves ￿rst by choosing
8whether to engage in costly monitoring or not;
2. the R&D project manager moves second by choosing whether to take action a = 0 or
a = 1, having observed whether the active monitor is monitoring or not;
3. the R&D project either succeeds or fails;
4. if it succeeds the proceeds from the project are distributed to all investors and the man-
ager.
Suppose that the active monitor decides to monitor the manager and incurs the monitoring
cost m > 0. Then as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1994), we assume that the manager￿ s net
private bene￿ts are lowered by a fraction (1 ￿ ￿), where ￿ < 1.
The manager must be incentivized to choose a = 1. If his ￿nancial stake in the project, ￿, is
large enough he will choose a = 1 even though his private bene￿ts are higher for a = 0. Formally,
the manager￿ s stake ￿ must be such that the following incentive compatibility constraint holds:
(￿v1 + ￿b)￿1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿1) ￿ (￿v0 + ￿b)￿0 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿0)
or
￿￿V + ￿￿￿(b +  ) ￿ 0:
where ￿V ￿ (v1￿1 ￿ v0￿0) and ￿￿ = ￿1 ￿ ￿0. 2
If there is no monitoring, on the other hand, the incentive compatibility constraint is: 3
￿￿V + ￿￿(b +  ) ￿ 0:
Monitoring is bene￿cial if two conditions are satis￿ed.
First, it must be the case that the ￿rm cannot get su¢ cient ￿nancing in the absence of
monitoring. That is, the ￿rm should not be able to invest in R&D, by using all its internal
funds Wi and raising (f ￿Wi) from outside investors, while at the same time granting su¢ cient
2Note that under our assumptions ￿V is strictly positive and ￿￿ is strictly negative.
3Since ￿￿ < 0 the incentive constraint is clearly harder to satisfy with no monitoring than under monitoring.
9￿nancial incentives to the entrepreneur to choose a = 1 even though there is no monitoring.
Therefore, a ￿rst condition is that:
(1 ￿ ￿)￿v1￿1 < f ￿ Wi
for any ￿ such that
￿￿V + ￿￿(b +  ) ￿ 0;
or
[1 +
￿￿(b +  )
￿V
]￿v1￿1 < f ￿ Wi:
Second, the ￿rm must be able to get ￿nancing when there is monitoring. The active monitor
has an incentive to monitor and incur the monitoring cost m as long as his stake ￿ in the ￿rm￿ s
pro￿t is large enough that ￿￿￿V ￿ m. In exchange for the stake ￿ = m
￿￿V , which just ensures
that he will monitor, the active monitor is willing to invest an amount equal to his expected
equilibrium net return: ￿￿v1￿1 ￿m. Therefore, the standalone ￿rm is viable under monitoring
if
(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)￿v1￿1 ￿ f ￿ Wi ￿ ￿￿v1￿1 + m;
or, substituting for ￿ and ￿ if:
(1 +









Rearranging, this condition reduces to:
[1 +
￿￿￿(b +  )
￿V
]￿v1￿1 ￿ f ￿ Wi + m:
Clearly, for ￿ large enough, and m and ￿ small enough this condition will be satis￿ed given
our assumption that
v1￿1 > f:
A conglomerate ￿rm operates n ￿ 2 business units that are wholly-owned subsidiaries. It
has corporate headquarters that make investment and R&D decisions for all divisions. A key
10feature of conglomerate ￿rms is that pro￿ts of subsidiaries are channeled to headquarters, who
report consolidated earnings to the ￿rm￿ s shareholders. Divisional managers typically cannot
be rewarded based on their division￿ s pro￿t, and their incentive pay-component is generally
based only on conglomerate pro￿ts and stock price. Moreover, divisional managers don￿ t own
the intellectual property they create, unless they negotiate a contract which explicitly gives
them the right to any innovation they create. 4
On the other hand, divisional managers may be closely monitored by headquarters. Another
advantage of undertaking research in a conglomerate is that failure can be hidden to some extent
inside the ￿rm, so that there is a lower stigma of failure. Conglomerates also develop winner
picking skills, and bene￿t from R&D spillovers on other divisions.
For our formal analysis we assume that conglomerate ￿rms are composed of only two divi-
sions, A and B. We also simplify the governance of conglomerate ￿rms to the CEO￿ s role in
picking winner R&D projects and to the CEO￿ s active monitoring of division managers. We
model winner picking by assuming that a project selected by headquarters has a probability of
success ￿￿(a), where ￿ ￿ 1. We model CEO monitoring by letting the CEO monitor division
managers j = A;B at cost ￿ and thereby lowering division managers￿private bene￿ts by a
fraction (1 ￿ ￿). If the divisional manager￿ s research is successful, however, it is owned by the
￿rm. Thus, division managers have lower powered incentives to pursue R&D in conglomerates.
5 In our model, a divisional manager can only extract a small share ￿ of the direct value of the
innovation by, for example, threatening to leave and pursue his research at another ￿rm. Thus,
the divisional manager￿ s incentive constraint for choosing action a = 1 in a conglomerate is:
(￿v1 + ￿b)￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿￿1)￿  ￿ (￿v0 + ￿b)￿￿0 + (1 ￿ ￿￿0)￿ ;
or
￿￿V + ￿￿￿(b +  ) ￿ 0:
4Such contracts are not common and even when a contract grants intellectual property rights to the innovator
it is di¢ cult to enforce.
5Divisional managers may get a share of conglomerate pro￿ts, but due to moral hazard in teams problems,
they will have lower powered incentives than if they received a share of their own division￿ s pro￿ts. For simplicity,
we ignore the ￿nancial incentives from shares in conglomerate pro￿ts.
11Finally, conglomerates have the ￿nancing advantage of drawing on the sum of liquid assets
of both divisions, (WA + WB), to fund a division￿ s R&D project. To summarize, in our model
a conglomerate picks the most promising R&D project from the divisions, thus ensuring a
probability of success of ￿￿1 in equilibrium. It ￿nances the project entirely with its own funds
(WA+WB) and it incurs monitoring costs ￿. Thus, the conglomerate￿ s expected return is given
by:
(1 ￿ ￿)v1￿￿1 ￿ f ￿ ￿ + WA + WB
provided that it can induce the divisional manager whose R&D project is picked to choose
action a = 1. Should ￿ be so low that
￿ <
￿￿￿(b +  )
￿V
then the division manager will choose a = 0, in which case we assume that the conglomerate
will not pick any R&D projects.
A business-group of n ￿ 2 ￿rms is similar to a conglomerate ￿rm. It has a controlling hub
akin to corporate headquarters and multiple divisions. The key di⁄erences with a conglomerate
are that: i) the business units are not wholly owned subsidiaries, but rather are independently
incorporated companies controlled by the group￿ s majority shareholders through a controlling
stake; ii) earnings of business units are not consolidated, and ownership of intellectual property
remains with the innovating business unit; iii) R&D project selection is more decentralized, so
that the group￿ s hub plays less of a winner picking role. The group mainly plays the role of an
internal capital market to fund R&D investments.
We denote by ’ the ownership share of the group and (1￿’) the share owned by minority
shareholders. An important potential source of ine¢ ciency in business groups is the separation
of ownership and control of business units. This separation can give rise to ine¢ cient diversion
of business unit earnings by the controlling shareholders. We model this diversion as in Almeida
and Wolfenzon (2006) by allowing the controlling shareholders to ￿divert￿d of earnings from






Group owners then choose d to maximize:





where ￿ denotes the business unit￿ s earnings. As is easily established, the optimal amount of









The earnings retained in the ￿rm￿ (v ￿
1￿’
￿ )￿ can be shared between the division manager and
all the owners. Thus division managers can be incentivized as in standalones based on the
non-diverted earnings. Moreover, the business unit manager￿ s private bene￿ts can be reduced
through monitoring by the group￿ s controlling owners.
As the literature on business groups has emphasized, the diversion of earnings by controlling
shareholders reduces the e¢ ciency of business groups relative to stand-alone ￿rms or conglom-
erates. 6 The pervasiveness of business groups around the world (with the important exceptions
of the U.S. and Great Britain) suggests, however, that there is also a countervailing e¢ ciency
improving role of business groups. 7 We argue that the e¢ ciency gain of business groups is due
to the stronger intellectual protection given to innovators in business units a¢ liated to business
groups, who can retain (partial) ownership of their patents.
To summarize, business groups combine the R&D incentive bene￿ts of stand-alone ￿rms with
the internal capital market bene￿ts of conglomerates. Given equal R&D incentives, however,
6There can also be diversion of funds from conglomerates with separation of ownership and control. For
simplicity we ignore this form of diversion in our model.
7While, some commentators simply explain the existence of business groups as an ine¢ cient outcome caused
by managerial entrenchment, others point to the value adding role of business groups as providers of a substitute
source of funding for investment in environments where external capital markets are ine¢ cient due to inadequate
investor protection. Thus, the prevalence of business groups in emerging market countries is seen as a necessary
but transitory consequence of the underdevelopment of securities markets in these countries. However, as our
evidence highlights, business groups are also prevalent in advanced countries, with developed securities markets
and strong investor protections. Moreover, as we show, these groups tend to be both very competitive and
innovative.
13business groups are less e¢ cient than conglomerates, as they involve both ine¢ cient diversion
of funds and less e⁄ective winner-picking.
3.Assumptions on external legal environment
Besides ￿ (the fraction of the value of innovations that is capitalizable) we introduce three
other key parameters to capture the external legal environment: ￿ an intercompany dividend
tax, ￿ the R&D project manager￿ s bargaining power, and   the stigma cost of failure. As we
argue in the next section, the main comparative advantages of the U.S. relative to the EU are
that U.S. securities markets free up a higher ￿ and ￿. Moreover, U.S. entrepreneurial culture
and bankruptcy laws also result in a lower  . Against these comparative advantages the EU￿ s
main advantage is a lower ￿.
3. Model Analysis
We divide the model analysis into two parts. We begin by considering the main tradeo⁄s in
organizational form keeping the external legal environment ￿xed. In a second step we do a
EU-US comparative analysis by analyzing how changes in the parameters (￿;￿; ) a⁄ect the
equilibrium distribution of R&D across organizational forms.
3.1. Main tradeo⁄s within a given legal environment
We consider in turn the choice between undertaking R&D in a stand-alone unit or inside a
conglomerate ￿rm, the pros and cons of a business-group and a conglomerate structure, and
￿nally the choice between stand-alone and a¢ liation to a business-group.
3.1.1. Stand-alone ￿rm vs. Conglomerate: the costs and bene￿ts of internal capital
markets
Consider the funding of R&D projects in a conglomerate with two business units, A and B.
To facilitate comparisons with a stand-alone ￿rm we assume that only one of the two units
has a potential research project, say division A. We also assume that the conglomerate has
14su¢ cient internal funds or capital to be able to fund the project without raising external
funds, (WA + WB) ￿ f. A conglomerate has lower costs of monitoring and greater winner-
picking skills, so that it will be more e¢ cient at R&D as long as it can provide adequate
incentives to choose action a = 1 to its divisional managers. Therefore, R&D is organized in a
conglomerate whenever divisional managers have su¢ cient incentives to choose action a = 1.
That is, whenever ￿ is large enough that:
￿ +
￿￿￿(b +  )
￿V
￿ 0:
If ￿ is too small then R&D may be organized in a standalone ￿rm provided that enough external
funding can be obtained, or:
[1 +
￿￿￿(b +  )
￿V
]￿v1￿1 ￿ f ￿ Wi + m:
In Figure 1 below we describe the parameter regions for which R&D takes place in respec-
tively a standalone ￿rm (SA) and a conglomerate (CL) in (￿V;f￿Wi+m) space. The function
h(￿V ) is given by
h(￿V ) ￿ [1 +
￿￿￿(b +  )
￿V
]￿v1￿1
and the vertical line ￿V# is
￿V# = ￿
￿￿￿(b +  )
￿
:
For all values of ￿V ￿ ￿V# the incentive constraint for a = 1 in conglomerates is satis￿ed
and R&D is organized in a conglomerate. For ￿V < ￿V#, R&D is not e¢ cient in a conglom-
erate, but it may be sustainable in a standalone ￿rm provided that the parameter values for
(￿V;f ￿ Wi + m) lie in the area (SA); that is, provided that (f ￿ Wi + m) ￿ m lies below
h(￿V ). In situations where the hold-up problem is so severe that R&D projects cannot be
undertaken e¢ ciently in a conglomerate, innovators may still be able to undertake their R&D
project in a standalone ￿rm provided that the external ￿nancing needs of the R&D project
15(f ￿ Wi) are su¢ ciently low, and/or the costs of monitoring the innovator (m) are su¢ ciently
low.
Simple comparative statics results can be inferred from Figure 1. In particular, any upward
shift in the function h(￿V ) and any rightward shift in ￿V# will increase the region of R&D in
standalones relative to conglomerates. In other words, an increase in ￿v1￿1 makes R&D easier
to sustain in standalones and an increase in j￿￿j makes it harder to sustain in conglomerates.
This suggests that high-risk-high-payo⁄ R&D (with high j￿￿j and high ￿v1￿1 is more likely to
be found in standalones than conglomerates.
Insert Figure 1 here
The role of Venture Capital (VC) in the US is mainly to target these types of innovations.
As we explain in the next section, we believe that in the EU in contrast to the US the role of
VCs is partly ￿lled by business-groups. The reason is that in the EU the capitalization of R&D
(as measured by ￿) is lower than in the US. Moreover the stigma of failure   is also higher.
3.1.2. Conglomerate vs. Business Group: internal capital markets, the cost of
diversion and the intercompany dividend tax and intellectual property rights
protection
Business groups can provide better protection of intellectual property rights of its business units
than conglomerates but they are exposed to ine¢ cient diversion of funds by their controlling
owners. Suppose that unit A is combined in a group with unit B, and as before suppose that
(WA + WB) ￿ f. Let ’A denote the group￿ s ownership share in a¢ liate A and suppose that
’A is large enough that the group has adequate incentives to actively monitor the manager of
a¢ liate A. Recall that for every $1 generated by a¢ liate A a fraction
1￿’A
￿ is diverted to the






is retained by the a¢ liate. Therefore, if the manager of A is
to e⁄ectively undertake an R&D project (i.e. to choose a = 1) his stake must be at least equal
to
￿ = ￿







16Setting ￿ = 1, its maximum possible value, it is then straighforward to see that a business
group with equilibrium diversion of funds
1￿’A
￿ is able to foster e¢ cient R&D in unit A as long
as ￿V ￿ ￿V￿ given by: 8
￿V￿ = ￿






Since business-groups involve costs which are not incurred by conglomerates they will only
be the chosen organization form for R&D activities when adequate R&D incentives cannot be
provided in conglomerates, or when ￿ <
1￿’A
￿ and ￿V 2 (￿V￿;￿V#).
But, even for these parameter values business groups may not be the chosen organizational
form if the tax burden in terms of intercompany dividend taxation exceeds the bene￿t from









in our model. Indeed, the reported (and undiverted) revenues by a¢ liate A in the event of a suc-













f. The business-group obtains a share ’A of realized pro￿ts on which it pays a marginal in-
tercompany dividend tax of ￿. If the tax rate ￿ is too high it may not be worthwhile for the
group to fund the R&D project in a¢ liate A. 9
3.1.3. Business Group vs. Stand-alone: diversion costs and the bene￿ts of internal
capital markets
The main advantage of Business groups over standalones is that they are able to tap the internal
capital of the entire group to fund new R&D projects. Given that business groups also involve




of the ￿nancial value of the innovation is siphoned o⁄ by the group. But note also that the higher is
the marginal cost of diversion ￿, the less funds are diverted and therefore the lower is the manager￿ s ￿nancial
stake necessary to incentivize him to do research. Similarly and somewhat paradoxically, the higher is ’A￿ the
group￿ s stake in a¢ liate A￿ the lower is the manager￿ s ￿nancial stake necessary to incentivize him.
9Intercompany dividend taxes are not the only cost of setting up a partially integrated business group. Other
tax rules, company registration rules, accounting rules concerning the consolidation of accounts and regulations
limiting the ￿ exibility of holding company structures may result in other costs. Thus, for example in the US
the Public Utility Holdings Company Act of 1935 has substantially limited the scope for business groups in the
energy sector.
17diversion costs, R&D will only be undertaken in a business group if it is not possible to fund
R&D in a standalone using costly external ￿nancing. This is illustrated in Figure 2 below.
Insert Figure 2 here
Again, simple comparative statics results can be seen from this ￿gure: an upward shift in
h(￿V ) increases the region of R&D in standalones and reduces the region in business groups
(BG). There is R&D in business groups for ￿V ￿ ￿V￿, only when it is not feasible in stand-
alones. When there is a rightward shift in ￿V￿, R&D in business groups is less likely. Such a
rightward shift may occur if ￿ is lower, so that there is more potential for diversion of funds. We
therefore expect the share of R&D taking place in business-groups across European countries
to be inversely related to the ease of diversion allowed by the corporate legal environment in
each country.
3.1.4. Business Group vs. Stand-alone and Conglomerates: the bene￿ts of internal
capital markets diversion costs and intellectual property rights protection
We can combine the comparison of the three organizational forms into a single ￿gure (Figure
3) and obtain the following broad comparative statics insights for ￿xed country parameters
(￿; ;￿).
Conglomerates will be a higher fraction of innovating ￿rms when there is a leftward shift in
￿V#. This shift may be due to either a higher ￿ or a lower ￿￿. One may expect industries with
many, incremental, innovations to have both higher ￿ (through greater implicit incentives) and
lower ￿￿. These industries are therefore more likely to be dominated by conglomerates. Their
ability to quickly identify the relevant innovation and to quickly redeploy assets gives these
organizational forms an edge over business groups and standalones. Moreover, in these indus-
tries conglomerates can credibly o⁄er adequate incentives for in house R&D without granting
formal ownership rights to the innovators.
Business groups are likely to be more prevalent in industries with a slower and more fun-
damental innovation cycle, where ￿￿ is higher (and ￿ lower). These organizational forms may
18not be the most e¢ cient in picking winners but they are able to provide better intellectual
ownership protection. To the extent that it is harder to divert funds (￿ is higher) we should
also see more innovating business groups, as ￿V￿ is then lower. But a more e¢ cient VC sector
with lower monitoring costs (m) and/or lower costs of external funds will tend to reduce the
dominance of business groups in these industries.
In general, we expect industry variation in the share of business groups among innovating
￿rms across industries. However, we also expect this variation to be smaller in countries where
the absolute advantage of one organizational form due to the country￿ s regulations and laws is
stronger.
Insert Figure 3 here
3.2. Main EU-US comparative predictions
Business groups have one major comparative advantage in continental European countries
relative to the US: the general absence of an intercompany dividend tax. In addition, there is
more of a stigma of failure in these European countries and ￿nancial markets are also somewhat
less developed. For all these reasons, we expect R&D to be concentrated in higher proportion
in business-groups relative to conglomerates and standalones in continental Europe than in the
US. For the same reasons, we expect to ￿nd more R&D activity in publicly traded ￿rms in
the US than in the EU. These simple predictions are indeed borne out in the data as we show
below.
4. Data
Our paper combines data from several sources: (1) ownership data from Amadeus for Euro-
pean ￿rms and from Icarus for American ￿rms (both are provided by BvDEP), (2) information
on patents from the United States Patent and Trademark O¢ ce (USPTO) and the European
Patent O¢ ce (EPO), and (3) scienti￿c publications from Thomson Web of Knowledge.
194.1. Ownership
The Amadeus and Icarus data sets contain detailed information on direct ownership links
between ￿rms. We sort ￿rms into four di⁄erent categories based on their ownership structure:
(i) standalones, (ii) conglomerates, (iii) wholly-owned business group a¢ liates, and (iv) partly-
owned business-group a¢ liates.
A ￿rm is categorized as a standalone if it has a single line of business and no parent
company, and as a conglomerate if it has more than one line of business. Many innovating
￿rms in our sample are wholly-owned a¢ liates ￿they have a parent company that owns 100%
of their shares ￿and it is not entirely obvious how one should categorize these ￿rms. In some
cases a wholly-owned a¢ liate is an independent economic unit, but in other cases, it acts
more like a division in terms of its retained pro￿ts and IP protection. We distinguish between
the two cases in the following way. We compute the share of assets that are held by the
company at the apex of the organization out of the total assets the organization holds. In case
this share exceeds a high-enough threshold (80%), we assume the organization is centralized
and categorize all of its wholly-owned a¢ liates as divisions.10 If the organization￿ s assets
are decentralized and spread across many a¢ liates, we assume the wholly-owned a¢ liates are
independent, and classify them under the business group category (a separate category named
wholly-owned business group a¢ liates). In the context of our model there is not much of
a di⁄erence between a division of a conglomerate and a wholly-owned subsidiary. There is a
signi￿cant di⁄erence, however, between a division of a conglomerate and a partly-owned business
group a¢ liate (our fourth category), as the latter has both a parent-company controlling-
shareholder and other minority shareholders. As our model highlights minority shareholders
in business-group a¢ liates play a central legal and governance role in protecting intellectual
property owned by the a¢ liate ￿rm. Business groups establish an intra-company separation of
ownership and control. This separation puts minority shareholders at risk of expropriation by
10If the apex company reports only consolidated accounts, we infer the unconsolidated assets held by the apex
company by subtracting the aggregated assets of all a¢ liates from the consolidated assets.
20majority shareholders, as the literature on business groups has emphasized. However, European
Corporate Group Law imposes strict provisions on the reallocation of resources between group
a¢ liates, which provide an intellectual property protection to researchers in a¢ liate ￿rms.
These provisions practically make the group a¢ liate independent in terms of its assets, patents,
and retained pro￿ts. Unlike for group a¢ liates, researchers in conglomerate divisions do not
have the same legal protection of intellectual property. Conglomerate headquarters can freely
reallocate assets, funds and IP rights across di⁄erent units with no legal restriction or threat
of litigation by division stakeholders. Our comparative analysis focuses mostly on the relative
prevalence of partly-owned business group a¢ liates, conglomerates, and standalones.
To fully characterize the ownership structure of ￿rms in our sample, we use ownership links
information for private and public American and European ￿rms from the ownership section
of the 2008 version of Icarus and Amadeus. To ensure that all ownership links truly represent
control, we make the following assumptions:
1. for private subsidiaries, we keep only links where the shareholder has at least 50% of the
voting rights, and
2. for public ￿rms we keep only links where the shareholder has at least 20% of the voting
rights. These two assumptions leave us with close to one million ownership links.11
3. to infer group structure from these links we use the algorithm developed and described in
Belenzon and Berkovitz (2008a). This algorithm constructs corporate ownership-chains
and groups together ￿rms controlled by the same ultimate owner. Appendix A.1 provides
more information about the ownership algorithm and group construction.
11Erring on the side of caution, we de￿ne control of a private ￿rm as owning at least 50% of the ￿rm￿ s voting
rights (excluding non-voting shares). Following previous literature on public ￿rms (La Porta et al. 1999; Faccio
and Lang, 2002; and others), which have a more dispersed ownership, we set the threshold for control of a public
￿rm at 20%. All our results are robust to di⁄erent numbers for these thresholds.
214.2. Patents and Scienti￿c Publications
To create a ￿rm-level measure of innovation, we examine patent based indicators of technological
advances by ￿rms.12 We construct a novel database of European and American ￿rm patents
by matching all granted patent applications from the USPTO and EPO to the complete set of
￿rms in Amadeus and Icarus. Our main source of information for patents granted between 1969
and 2002 is USPTO data as assembled in the NBER patent ￿le.13 Because our ownership data
is cross-sectional for 2008, we also include recently issued patents so as to address potential
concerns that the ownership structure we observe is not contemporaneous with the generation
of patents in our sample. We update the NBER patent ￿le for 2007 by extracting directly
from the USPTO website all patents granted between 2003 and 2007, adding about 750.000
patents to the original NBER patent data.14 For the EPO, our main information source is the
2007 publication of the PATSTAT database, which is the standard source for European patent
data and is published by the EPO. This database contains all European patent applications
and granted patents from the beginning of the EPO system in 1978 to 2007. For each USPTO
and EPO patent document we have information on the name of the ￿rm to which the patent
is assigned as well as the ￿rm￿ s address. We match the name and the address ￿elds from
the patent document to the name and address ￿elds in Amadeus and Icarus. Appendix A.2.
provides details about the matching procedure.
Another innovation indicator is scienti￿c publications in academic journals (Cockburn and
Henderson, 1998). We also look at scienti￿c publications for two main reasons. First, not all
inventions are patentable, and even if they are, patents can vary substantially in quality. Sci-
enti￿c publications, on the other hand, are not subject to the patentability selection problem,
12We use patents data to measure innovative activity, because we do not have direct information on R&D
expenditures for private ￿rms. For a discussion on the use of patents data as a measure of inventive activity,
see Griliches (1990).
13This database is described by Hall, Ja⁄e and Trajtenberg (2001) and Ja⁄e and Trajtenberg (2002).
14The general pattern of results holds when focusing on recently granted patents. Table A3 reports the
distribution of patents by country and organization form for USPTO patents that were granted between 1996
and 2006. Only 1 percent of the American patents are held by partly-owned a¢ liates, as compared to 12% and
11% of French and Italian patents, respectively.
22and they are generally regarded as indicators of high-quality research. Second, while patents
typically represent more directed and incremental research, scienti￿c publications tend to be
the result of more basic and risky research (Belenzon and Patacconi, 2009). To measure the
publication activity of our sample ￿rms, we develop a data set of ￿rm scienti￿c articles. The
world￿ s largest source of information on scienti￿c publications is Thomson￿ s ISI Web of Knowl-
edge, which includes publication records on hundreds of international journals in the ￿ hard￿
sciences. Each publication has an address ￿eld which contains the authors￿a¢ liation. We
match all ￿rms (patenting and non-patenting) by name to the complete ISI database using the
author a¢ liation name and address ￿elds.1516
5. Empirical evidence
Several striking ￿ndings emerge from our analysis, as summarized in tables 1-3. First, while the
overall distribution of patents by ownership structure in the whole sample is 18% standalones,
74% conglomerates, and 8% business-group a¢ liates, in the U.S. this distribution is skewed
towards standalones and conglomerates, 20% and 76% of patents fall in these categories, and
only 4% of innovating ￿rms are a¢ liated with a business-group. In Europe, on the other hand,
20% of patents are held by business-group a¢ liates. A similar pattern emerges for EPO patents
and scienti￿c publications. There is also a substantial variation in organizational form among
European countries. Germany resembles the U.S. in some ways, as 80% of its patents are held
15It is important to note that we make no restrictions on the availability of accounting information for our
sample ￿rms. That is, every ￿rm that was matched to the patent or publications data sets is included in our
analysis. While the coverage of accounting information is likely to vary across countries, especially for very
small ￿rms, the coverage of names and addresses is rather constant across countries regardless of ￿rm size. The
general pattern of results continues to hold when we exclude ￿rms for which we have no accounting information,
or ￿rms with less than 20 employees (this threshold tends to reduce di⁄erences in coverage across countries).
16Although we do not exclude ￿rms from our sample if they do not report ￿nancial information, some inter-
esting observations emerge from examining only ￿rms for which ￿nancial information is available. Standalone
￿rms tend to be substantially smaller than conglomerates and partly-owned a¢ liates, while conglomerates and
partly-owned a¢ liates do not di⁄er much on size. The average standalone ￿rm has 177 employees (a median
of 20), and about $100 million in annual sales (a median of $8.3 million). The average conglomerate has
3.650 employees (a median of 136), and $918 million in annual sales (a median of $14.3 million). The average
partly-owned a¢ liate has 2.400 employees (a median of 214), and about $1 billion (a median of $65 million).
Comparing conglomerates to partly owned-a¢ liates, the di⁄erent in mean size (annual sales) is not signi￿cant
(a t-stat of -0.482).
23by conglomerates and only 9% by business-group a¢ liates17. In contrast, France is heavily
skewed towards business-groups, where only 35% of patents are held by conglomerates.
Second, the presence of minority shareholders in innovating a¢ liates varies enormously
across countries. While in the U.S. and Great Britain only 1% of innovation takes place
in a¢ liates with minority shareholders, about 20% and 15% of French and Italian patents,
respectively, are concentrated in a¢ liates with minority shareholders.
Third, the U.S. patents distribution is heavily skewed towards publicly traded ￿rms (table
2). Indeed, the fraction of patents held by publicly traded U.S. corporations is above 60%, while
this fraction is only about 40% for European ￿rms. This percentage also varies substantially
across European countries: in Germany, 57% of USPTO patents are assigned to publicly traded
￿rms; in contrast, in France and Italy only 9% and 3% respectively of patents are assigned to
public ￿rms. Moreover, a large share of publicly traded ￿rms in continental Europe belong to
business groups: in France and Germany this percentage is above 40, while in the U.S. and
Great Britain only 2% of publicly traded ￿rms belong to a business group. Yet, in the U.S.
there is also a higher percentage of standalone publicly traded ￿rms compared with continental
Europe and Great Britain.
Table 3 further highlights the di⁄erences in the distribution of patents by ownership type
across countries. Panel A describes the top 20 American innovating ￿rms. Leading the list
is IBM with more than 43.000 USPTO patents. All American ￿rms in this table have the
same ownership structure: they are all conglomerates and are publicly traded. Panel B focuses
on British ￿rms, which resemble the American conglomerate structure.18 Panel C examines
17The German data on conglomerate dominance in R&D, however, is driven mostly by four large ￿rms:
Siemens, Robert Bosch, Bayer and BASF. These conglomerates hold about 60% of all German patents. Ex-
cluding these organizations, business groups account for 21% of German patents, and conglomerates account
for 52%.
18Ownership structure in Great Britain di⁄ers somewhat from that in the U.S. While the parent company of
a British organization is usually publicly traded, all innovative a¢ liates in our sample are private companies. A
good example that illustrates this rather unique structure is GlaxoSmithKline. This pharmaceutical giant has
three of its a¢ liates appearing in the top 20 most innovative ￿rms (Beecham, Glaxo Group, and SmithKline
Beecham). Each ￿rm is wholly owned by GlaxoSmithKline holding-company. While the holding company
is publicly traded, none of the innovative a¢ liates are. Glaxo has two headquarters - GlaxoWellcome, and
SmithKline Beecham, and a holding company that wholly-owns the whole organization. We classify Glaxo as a
24the leading innovating ￿rms in France. More than half of these companies are business group
a¢ liates, where seven of these have minority shareholders. Only 40% of the ￿rms are publicly
traded. For Germany (panel D), 20% of the German ￿rms are partly-owned business-group
a¢ liates. Lastly, 40% of the Italian ￿rms are partly-owned business group a¢ liates (panel E),
and only one Italian ￿rm is publicly-traded.19
Another interesting observation relates to di⁄erences in patent assignment in conglomerates
and business-groups. U.S. conglomerates usually assign patents to headquarters or to special
central intellectual property management divisions, and not to the division where patent was
generated. For example, IBM assigns almost all patents its divisions generate to its New-York
headquarters (as indicated by the assignee name on the patent records)20. Other examples of
large conglomerates that adopt a central patent management structure include General Electric
(where 21,830 out of 22,348 of GE￿ s patents are assigned to its Global Research Center division
in New-York), and 3M (where 10,640 out of the 10,806 of 3M￿ s patents are assigned to its
headquarters, and the remaining patents are assigned to the wholly-owned IP management
subsidiary 3M Innovative Property).
In contrast, business-groups have a decentralized patent assignment. We hypothesize that
the presence of minority shareholders makes it di¢ cult to simply transfer IP assets from the
inventing to the controlling ￿rm. In France, for example, L￿ Oreal holds 3,135 USPTO patents,
out of a total number of 4,882 patents assigned to the whole Nestle group. Assigning L￿ Oreal￿ s
patents to Nestle would be considered an expropriation of the rights of minority shareholders of
L￿ Oreal. The transfer of patents to the controlling entity requires some form of valuation and
compensation of shareholders of the originating ￿rm. This is likely to be a di¢ cult transaction,
conglomerate although it has two headquarters, and a holding company at the apex.
19In table 3 we do not control for ￿rm age, which means that older ￿rms are more likely to appear on
the list of innovative ￿rms than younger ones. We examine the robustness of our ￿ndings by looking only at
recent patenting activity. Our list of most innovating ￿rms does not appear to be very sensitive to ￿rm age.
For example, the largest patentees in the USPTO between 2002 and 2006 are IBM (16.270 patents), Micron
Technology (8.383 patents), Intel (7.729 patents), Siemens (7.023 patents), and Robert Bosch (5.870 patents).
20Interestingly, the pattern of scienti￿c publications assignments is di⁄erent than that of patent assignments.
Where all IBM￿ s patents are assigned to headquarters, academic publications are always assigned to IBM￿ s
research centers, mostly in Yorktown Heights New-York, Austin Texas and LA.
25which is why patents mostly remain with the originating ￿rm.
Insert Tables 1-3 here
Why do we observe a high concentration of business-groups in Europe, but not in the U.S.?
Based on the history of business-groups in the U.S., a leading explanation in our view is the
tax treatment of intercompany dividends. These have been taxable in the U.S. since the great
depression, but are generally not taxable in continental European countries. Under the U.S.
tax system, dividend income transferred from a subsidiary to the parent company is subject to
a 7.5% tax. A similar tax does not exist in Europe. As described by Morck (2005), the U.S.
tax reform of the 1930￿ s was a response to the corporate scandals of the late 1920s, and the
Roosevelt administration￿ s belief that the proliferation of a¢ liate ￿rms in business-groups have
made these groups very opaque to outsiders, thus creating major governance, tax avoidance,
market power, and political in￿ uence problems.
In addition to introducing the inter-company dividend tax, the U.S. congress also abol-
ished consolidated tax ￿lings for business-groups, eliminated capital gains taxes on liquidated
controlled subsidiaries, and banned large pyramidal groups for controlling public utility com-
panies (the Public Utilites Holdings Company Act or PUHCA of 1935). These policies impose
a high penalty on organizing innovation in business-groups in the U.S. Thus, one would expect
to observe more business-groups, on average, in Europe, especially in industries where group
governance bene￿ts are substantial.
5.1. Comparative analysis
Our theoretical analysis points to several predictions concerning the choice of organizational
form, in terms of both the country￿ s legal environment and ￿nancial development, and also the
nature of the innovation cycle in each industry. Hereafter the analysis is mostly based on the
number of EPO patents, where all ￿ndings are robust to using USPTO patents and scienti￿c
publications.
265.1.1. Comparison across countries
Three key country variables are likely to a⁄ect the choice of organizational form: (i) the capital-
ization value of R&D projects, (ii) the deadweight cost of diverting funds from business-group
a¢ liates, and (iii) the presence or not of intercompany dividend taxes and other regulatory
constraints on the formation of business group. We take as a simple measure of capitalization
of future cash ￿ ows the ratio of the country￿ s stock market capitalization and GDP. Our main
prediction is that innovators are more likely to undertake their R&D project in a standalone
￿rm when they are able to raise more funds by capitalizing a bigger fraction of the innovation￿ s
expected value. Similarly, in countries where the diversion of funds from a¢ liates is harder
we expect to see more R&D activity organized in business group a¢ liates. Finally, countries
with higher intercompany dividend taxes and more regulatory constraints on business group
will have less R&D activity organized in business group a¢ liates.
Table 4 summarizes general ￿ndings from the cross-country comparison. We rank countries
according to the three-year average ratio of stock-market traded value to GDP (Beck et al., 2000,
2007). As expected, the share of patents held by public ￿rms is much higher in the top ￿nancial
development quartile than in the lowest one (63.1% versus 18.0%). We also expect a higher
prevalence of standalones in countries with higher capitalization ratios. Interestingly however,
our ￿ndings are only partially consistent with the theory. While, as expected, standalones
are more prevalent than business-groups in the high-capitalization countries, they are also
more prevalent than conglomerates in low-capitalization countries. Business groups are much
more prevalent in low-capitalization countries (20.6% versus 1.6% of the patents are held by
partly-owned a¢ liates in low and high capitalization countries, respectively). This ￿nding
is consistent with the view that business-groups substitute for missing ￿nancial markets in
fostering innovation. 21
21Note that the reverse causality may also explain this outcome, if the existence of business-groups impedes
the natural development of ￿nancial markets. Belenzon and Berkovitz (2008b) address this causality issue in
the following way. They analyze a key channel through which ￿nancial development a⁄ects group a¢ liation
- internal capital markets. If ￿rms form business groups to create a substitute for underdeveloped ￿nancial
markets, we would observe a higher probability of group a¢ liation among ￿rms that operate in industries where
27We proxy the cost of diversion of funds from a¢ liates with the anti-directive index developed
by La Porta et al. (1997). This index measures the overall strength of a country￿ s minority
shareholders protection laws. In countries where these laws are stricter, it is more costly
to divert funds from one a¢ liate to another. Innovation in business groups should be more
prevalent in countries with stronger minority shareholders protection laws. Surprisingly, we do
not ￿nd support for this prediction. There is in fact a higher share of innovation in business-
groups in countries with relatively weak minority protection laws (9.3% in the lowest minority
protection quartile versus 1.5% in the highest quartile). There appears to be no substantial
variation in the distribution of patents across public and private ￿rms between countries with
weak and strong minority shareholders protection laws. This is again surprising in light of the
strong correlation between ￿nancial development and minority shareholders protection laws.
To understand better what may be driving these results, we turn to a more detailed com-
parison of organizational forms across countries.
Insert Table 4 here
Business groups vs. Conglomerates In comparing business groups to conglomerates
we consider two factors: anti-group laws, and the strength of minority shareholder protection.
Anti-group laws and weak minority shareholder protection make business groups less attractive.
Anti-group laws are strong in the U.S., but hardly exist in Europe. Thus, other things equal, we
expect more innovation to be concentrated in business groups in Europe than in the U.S. Only
1.5% of U.S. and U.K. patents are held by partly-owned a¢ liates, while in continental Europe
11.2% of the patents are held by partly-owned a¢ liates. This percentage varies signi￿cantly
across countries, reaching a high of 25% in France. This pattern is consistent with the theory.
Computing the ratio between patents held by partly-owned a¢ liates and conglomerates, leads to
the demand for external capital is higher, especially in countries with less developed ￿nancial institutions. Thus,
their econometric approach is to examine whether the di⁄erence in the percentage of group a¢ liates between
industries with high and low external dependence becomes more pronounces as the country ￿nancial development
deteriorates. The evidence suggests that business-groups indeed substitute missing ￿nancial institutions.
28a similar conclusion. In France 11.550 patents are held by a¢ liates with minority shareholders,
and 20.676 patents are held by conglomerates22. The ratio between the number of partly-
owned a¢ liate and conglomerate patents for France is 0.56 (11.550/20.676), for Italy 0.62
(2.320/3.763), for Germany 0.0823 (10.949/135.220), for Great Britain 0.02 (631/30.809), and
for the U.S. 0.02 (3.417/198.006). These ￿gures imply that relative to conglomerates, partly-
owned a¢ liates are more prevalent in France and Italy than in the U.S., Great Britain, and
Germany.
There is substantial variation in the anti-directive index across countries. For France, the
anti-directive index is 3, as compared to 1 for Germany. Our theoretical analysis predicts a
higher share of innovation in business groups in France than in Germany. The ￿ndings support
this prediction (a ratio of 0.56 for France versus a ratio of 0.08 for Germany). Yet, when we
compare Great Britain to Germany, the opposite ranking emerges: in Britain only 631 patents
are held by partly-owned a¢ liates, as compared to about 30.809 patents by conglomerates.
Indeed, minority shareholders in a¢ liates are very rare in Britain, which is a puzzle given that
Britain has unusually strong minority shareholder protections.
Standalones vs. conglomerates Standalones should be more prevalent than conglomerates
in countries with more developed ￿nancial markets (R&D capitalization value is higher). To
examine the prevalence of standalones relative to conglomerates we compute the ratio of the
number of patents held by standalones and the number of patents held by conglomerates. Our
￿ndings are mixed. In the U.S., 23.970 patents are held by standalones, and 198.006 patents are
held by conglomerates. The standalones-conglomerates ratio, thus, is 0.12. For Great Britain,
France and Germany, the ratio is 0.17, 0.11, and 0.20, respectively. Compared to the U.S.,
standalones are relatively more prevalent than conglomerates in Great Britain and Germany,
22For business-groups, we focus only on a¢ liates with minority shareholders, because anti-group and minority-
shareholder protection laws typically do not apply to wholly-owned a¢ liates. When including also wholly-owned
a¢ liates, 50% of the French patents are held by business-groups.
23The top four German conglomerates hold 94.180 patents in the EPO. Excluding these companies raises the
ratio between business group and conglomerate patents to 0.27.
29and have a similar prevalence in France. For smaller countries in our sample, the ranking
is also unclear: Switzerland has a very high market capitalization, especially as compared
to the Netherlands. The standalones-conglomerates ratio in Switzerland, is 0.16, and in the
Netherlands it is 0.03. This ranking is consistent with our theoretical analysis, but when we
compare the Netherlands to France or Germany, which by our measure have lower stock-market
capitalizations, the ￿ndings become inconsistent with our theory.
Business groups vs. Standalones Standalones are likely to represent a bigger share
of R&D than business-groups in countries where anti-group laws are strong and minority-
shareholder protection is weak. As the U.S. has both more restrictive anti-group laws and
stronger minority-shareholder protections than European countries, it is not entirely clear how
the U.S. would compare with Europe in terms of the relative shares of R&D in standalones
and business groups. However, as the tax costs of running a business-group are so high in the
U.S. relative to Europe, we expect innovating standalones to be more prevalent in the U.S.
than in Europe. Our evidence supports this prediction. The ratio between the number of
patents held by partly-owned business group a¢ liates and standalones in the U.S. is 0.14, and
is 0.19 in Europe. This ratio varies considerably across European countries: in Great Britain
the a¢ liates-standalones ratio is 0.12, in Germany is 0.41, and in France is 5.07.
As for the e⁄ects of minority-shareholder protections, our evidence is again mixed. While the
Germany-France comparison is consistent with our analysis, as minority-shareholder protections
are higher in France (at least as re￿ ected by the anti-directive index), the comparison with Great
Britain is not. The ratio between business group and standalone patents in Great Britain is
much lower than in Germany and France, again despite the fact that minority-shareholder
protections in Great Britain are substantially higher.
What could explain these mixed results on organizational form and country conditions?
There are three possibilities: (i) country conditions may be endogenously a⁄ected by owner-
ship structure; (ii) unobserved and observed country heterogeneity make it hard to obtain a
30clean identi￿cation, and; (iii) di⁄erent industry specialization across countries may a⁄ect the
aggregate distribution of organizational forms. To examine in greater depth the choice of orga-
nizational form across industries, we turn next to an analysis of organizational variation across
industries.
5.1.2. Comparing across industries
In industries with rapid, incremental, innovations the ability of conglomerate ￿rms to quickly
identify the relevant innovations and to quickly redeploy assets may give it an edge over business
groups. In contrast, in industries with a slower and more fundamental innovation cycle, the
intellectual protection of the innovator may be of greater importance, giving business groups
an edge over conglomerates. To explore these predictions, we look at four di⁄erent industries:
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology as examples of industries with a long innovation cycle,
and computer hardware and telecommunications as examples of industries with rapid and
incremental innovations. Table 5 summarizes the main ￿ndings for EPO patents.
Business groups vs. Conglomerates By our theoretical analysis, innovation ought to
be more prevalent in a partly-owned business group a¢ liates than in a conglomerate division
in the pharmaceuticals and biotechnology industries, but not in the computer hardware and
telecommunications sectors. Our ￿ndings con￿rm this prediction. In pharmaceuticals and
biotechnology the ratio between the number of business group patents and conglomerate patents
is 0.07, and 0.21, respectively24, where in computer hardware and telecommunications the
respective ratios are substantially lower at 0.02 and 0.03.25
Another interesting ranking emerges when comparing the U.S. to Europe. In the U.S., the
patent ratio of business-group-to-conglomerate patents for both pharmaceuticals and biotech-
24When including patents by wholly-owned business group a¢ liates, the pharmaceuticals and biotechnology
ratios are 0.13 and 0.28.
25When including patents by wholly-owned business group a¢ liates, the computer hardware and telecom-
munications ratios are 0.06 (354/5.876) and 0.11 (3.667/34.286). It is interesting to note that the majority
of business group patents are held by wholly-owned a¢ liates, especially in telecommunications, and not in
partly-owned a¢ liates, as in pharmaceuticals and biotechnology.
31nology is 0.01. In Europe, on the other hand, these ￿gures are much higher at 0.11 and 0.35,
respectively. The prevalence of business groups in pharmaceuticals and biotechnology is, thus,
strongly driven by European ￿rms. For computer hardware and telecommunications the re-
spective ratios are very small in both the U.S. and Europe, indicating that innovation activity
in partly-owned a¢ liates is very small.
Standalones vs. Conglomerates Standalones resemble partly-owned a¢ liates in terms of
their governance structure, and thus should have the same relative advantages over conglomer-
ates in pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, but less so in computer hardware and telecommuni-
cations. Thus, the relative prevalence of standalones should be similar to that of partly-owned
a¢ liates. Our ￿ndings support this prediction. In pharmaceuticals and biotechnology the ratios
between standalone and conglomerate patents are 0.20 and 0.32, respectively, where in com-
puter hardware and telecommunications these ratios are substantially lower at 0.11 and 0.07.
Again, in industries where high-powered incentives are of greater importance, partly-owned af-
￿liates are more prevalent. Standalones seem to be more prevalent in the U.S. than in Europe,
especially in biotechnology. This ￿nding is consistent with our theory, which predicts a higher
prevalence of standalones in countries where R&D capitalization value is higher, especially in
industries where the governance bene￿ts of standalones are more pronounced.
Business groups vs. Standalones Partly-owned a¢ liates and standalones have a similar
governance structure. However, partly-owned a¢ liates can bene￿t from the business-group
internal capital market. On the other hand, standalones face smaller diversion costs than
a business-group a¢ liate. These considerations imply that we would expect partly-owned
a¢ liates to be more prevalent than standalones in industries where winner-picking is more
important, especially in countries that do not have anti-group laws, and where minority pro-
tection is strong. Our ￿ndings, however, do not support this prediction: business-groups are
more prevalent as compared to standalones in pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, than in com-
32puter hardware and telecommunications26. A potential explanation is related to fund raising.
Standalones, especially those that operate in countries with less developed ￿nancial markets,
may ￿nd it easier to ￿nance projects that have a shorter development cycle. In this respect,
business-groups may be able to provide more stable ￿nancing for longer term and riskier re-
search projects.
Insert Table 5 here
5.2. Patent quality
So far our analysis focused on the number of patents. However, it is well recognized that the
distribution of patent quality is highly skewed, where a small portion of patents receive many
citations, and the majority of patents receive only few or no citations at all. Using the number
of citations a patent receives as our main quality indicator, table 6 compares the quality of
conglomerate and partly-owned a¢ liate patents (for brevity, we do not discuss the respective
comparison for patents by standalones). We control for cohort and technology area e⁄ects using
the weighting scheme proposed by Trajtenberg (1990). For each patent, we divide the number
of citations it receives by the average number of citations received by all patents granted at the
same year and classi￿ed under the same three-digit technology code.
Panel A reports the comparison analysis for U.S. and Great Britain patents. Conglomerate
patents seem to be of higher quality than business group patents: the average conglomerate
patent receives 1.23 (weighted) citations, as compared to a business group patent that receives
on average 1.12 citations (the di⁄erence in means is signi￿cant at the 1% level). We also examine
the case of self-citations; where an inventor cites one of its predecessor patents. Self-citations
are commonly regarded as measures of cumulative innovation, and are typically associated
with greater private value (Hall et al., 2005). Conglomerate patents receive signi￿cantly more
self-citations than business group patents (1.57 versus 0.98). Additional indicators of patent
26The ratios between partly-owned a¢ liate and standalone patents are 0.37 and 0.66 in pharmaceuticals and
biotechnology, and 0.24 and 0.42 in computer hardware and telecommunications, respectively.
33importance are generality and originality. These indicators measure the extent the knowledge
embodied in a patent ￿ spills-over￿to more technology areas (generality), or builds on knowledge
from many di⁄erent technology ￿elds (originality).27 With respect to patent generality and
originality, conglomerates also seem to dominate. The average generality (originality) value
for a conglomerate patent is 0.278 (0.274), as compared to 0.266 (0.264) for a business group
patent (the di⁄erence in means is signi￿cant at the 1% level).
We conduct the same comparison for continental European countries (panel B). Interest-
ingly, the opposite pattern of results emerges. Business group patents tend to be of higher
quality and concern more basic research than conglomerate patents. The average conglomerate
patent receives 0.71 citations, as compared to a business group patent that receives on average
0.88 citations (the di⁄erence in means is signi￿cant at the 1% level). Business group patents
are also more general and original: the average generality (originality) value for a conglomerate
patent is 0.231 (0.226), as compared to 0.264 (0.239) for a business group patent (the di⁄erence
is signi￿cant at the 1% level).
Insert Table 6 here
5.3. Coasian or Entrenched organizational forms?
A basic premise of our analysis is a Coasian perspective on ￿rm organization, which is to say
that R&D intensive ￿rms tend to choose the corporate form that is best suited for fostering
innovative activities. Thus, we expect a corporate form that is particularly well suited for
27We follow Trajtenberg et. al. (1997), and compute patent generality as the Her￿ndahl-Hirschman Index
of the concentration of the citations a patent receives across three-digit technology ￿elds. The generality index
for patent i, dented by Gi, is:







Where, j denotes three-digit technology ￿elds, CRij is the number of citations received by patent i from
patents in technology ￿eld j; and CRi is the total number of citations received by patent i. For patent
originality, we use the same formulation, but for the distribution of the number of citations the patent makes
across technology ￿elds.
34innovative ￿rms to be more prevalent among these ￿rms in a given industry than among non-
innovating ￿rms. The alternative view in the literature is that organization form is chosen by
entrenched managers, or controlling shareholders, to suit their best interests at the expense of
minority shareholders and overall ￿rm e¢ ciency. By this latter view it is not obvious that one
should see any systematic di⁄erence in organization form in a given industry across innovative
and non-innovative ￿rms. In this section we explore the extent to which organization formdi⁄ers
between innovative and non-innovative ￿rms. Essentially, we examine whether innovative ￿rms
are disproportionately represented in a given organization category, using aggregated sales in
the same category as a benchmark. We say that patents are disproportionately represented in
one category over another, if the patent ratio of the two categories is higher than the sale ratio
of the same categories. For this comparison our sample includes close to 3.5 million ￿rms with
sales information.
Table 7 summarizes the main ￿ndings. First, patents are disproportionately concentrated
in partly-owned a¢ liates relative to standalones, with patent and sales ratios of 0.57 and
0.33, respectively. This pattern is driven mostly by ￿rms in continental Europe, where the
patent and sale ratios are 0.84 and 0.56. In the U.S. and Great Britain, on the other hand,
these ratios are virtually identical at 0.14 and 0.12. Second, patents are disproportionately
concentrated in conglomerates relative to partly-owned a¢ liates (patent and sale ratios of
0.09 and 0.17). This pattern is much stronger in continental Europe, where the patent and
sale ratios are 0.17 and 0.42, respectively. In the U.S., these ratios are identical at 0.02.
Third, organization form varies substantially across industries. As in the previous section,
we focus on pharmaceuticals and biotechnology (panel B)28, and telecommunications (panel
C). Consistent with the Coasian perspective, in pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, innovation
is disproportionately concentrated in partly-owned a¢ liates relative to conglomerates (patent
28We combine pharmaceuticals and biotechnology because many companies that operate in pharmaceuticals
also operate biotechnology. Unlike patents, where we can classify each patent to a technology ￿eld according to
its IPC code, it is much more di¢ cult to breakdown sales by industries, especially in conglomerates that usually
report consolidated accounts.
35and sale ratios of 0.11 and 0.06). Yet again, this pattern is driven by European ￿rms. In the
U.S. alone, the patent and sale ratios are identical (0.01), while in Europe the patents ratio is
substantially higher than the sales ratio (0.18 versus 0.13). In telecommunications (panel C), on
the other hand, business-group patents are under-represented relative to sales in Europe (patent
and sale ratios of 0.04 and 0.08, respectively), and in the U.S., the patent and sale ratios are
e⁄ectively zero. Finding disproportionately more conglomerate patents in telecommunications
is also consistent with the Coasian perspective, as we expect that in this industry conglomerates
are more conductive to R&D than business-groups.
Insert Table 7 here
5.4. Robustness
We conduct several robustness tests to check the sensitivity of our ￿ndings, focusing mostly
on the ownership algorithm, and organization form de￿nitions. To ensure ownership shares
represent control, we keep only links where the shareholder has at least 50% of the voting rights
for private ￿rms, and 20% of the voting rights for public ￿rms. We check the sensitivity of our
results by experimenting with di⁄erent control thresholds. The same pattern of results continue
to hold for thresholds of 40% and 25% for private ￿rms, and 10% for public ￿rms. Furthermore,
we construct business group structures using the algorithm developed by Almeida, Yong Park,
Subrahmanyam, and Wolfenzon, 2007 (AYPSW). Due to computational power constraints we
are not able to run their algorithm on our full set of ￿rms. While restricting the ownership
sample is problematic, the general pattern that emerges highly resembles the one generated
by our own algorithm. The advantage of AYPSW over our algorithm is that it better deals
with cases of cross-holdings (for example, ￿rm A control 50% of the voting rights of ￿rm B,
and ￿rm B controls 50% of the voting rights of ￿rm A).29 However, while cross-holdings are
prevalent in East-Asian countries, where the AYPSW algorithm was ￿rst implemented, we ￿nd
29The main advantage of our algorithm over AYPSW is that it is better designed to e¢ ciently handle large
datasets on ownership ties.
36that cross-holdings are very rare in Europe. Actually, only 0.01% of the ownership chains our
algorithm generates are associated with some form of cross-holdings.
We distinguish between standalones and conglomerates by determining whether a ￿rm is
specialized or diversi￿ed. We assume a ￿rm is diversi￿ed if it operates in at least two di⁄erent
two-digit industry SIC. The same pattern of results continue to hold when we de￿ne diversi-
￿cation at the one-digit SIC level. Moreover, we supplement the industry information with
data on the ￿rm patenting distribution across technology ￿elds. We check whether diversi￿ed
￿rms also tend to patent in more than one technology areas. We ￿nd that about 80% of the
conglomerates in our sample patent in more than one two-digit IPC ￿elds. The general pattern
of results continue to hold when we use the IPC ￿elds in de￿ning conglomerates.
We also distinguish between patents that were acquired by a business group and patents
that were generated internally. We use Zephyr to track changes in ownership structure through
M&As (table A1). We ￿nd that, on average, 9% of the ￿rms joined a business group between
1997 and 2007, where the remaining 91% are associated with an organic business group ex-
pansion. Our main ￿ndings continue to hold also when excluding patents that were acquired
through M&A.
6. Conclusion
This paper examines the relation between organization form and innovation for a cross-section
of private and publicly traded innovating ￿rms in the U.S. and 15 European countries. Several
new ￿ndings emerge from our analysis. First, while most innovating ￿rms in the U.S. are
publicly traded conglomerates, a substantial fraction of innovation is concentrated in private
￿rms and in business groups in continental European countries. Second, there is a substantial
variation in organization form across industries. Business groups tend to be concentrated in
industries where innovation takes time, is highly uncertain, and where the intellectual protection
of the innovator may be of paramount importance. On the other hand, conglomerates are more
prevalent in industries with rapid, incremental, innovation where the ability of conglomerates
37to promptly identify the relevant innovation and to quickly redeploy assets may give it an edge
over business groups. Third, our ￿ndings are consistent with a Coasian view of how ￿rms
organize themselves: namely that R&D intensive ￿rms tend to choose the corporate form most
conducive to innovation. This is especially true in Europe, where there are fewer regulatory
hurdles to the formation of business groups and hybrid corporate forms. It is not the case in the
U.S., where tax and regulatory hurdles essentially eliminate any gains from forming business
groups, and where a highly visible VC and private equity sector provides an alternative to
business-group ￿nancing of R&D.
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42A. Appendix
A.1. Constructing ownership structure
This section details the construction and output of our newly developed algorithm. The pur-
pose of the algorithm is to determine the structure of European business-groups based on the
Amadeus ownership database. The algorithm consists of two parts: a control-chain genera-
tor that constructs the ownership and control links between di⁄erent European ￿rms, and a
name matching procedure that groups together ￿rms controlled by the same ultimate owner.
Our source of information is the ownership sections of the 2008 versions of Amadeus (for the
European subsidiaries) and Icarus (for the American subsidiaries).
A.1.1. The Control chain generator
The Amadeus ownership database includes detailed information on the percentage of owner-
ship between European corporate shareholders and their European subsidiaries. The data span
virtually all European countries (including Eastern Europe). Icarus provides similar informa-
tion for the United States. We develop an ownership algorithm that constructs the internal
structure of business-groups based on these inter-company ownership links. The main bene￿ts
of the algorithm are: (i) it constructs the ownership chains without relying on the (often miss-
ing) information on whether an ownership link is direct or indirect,30 (ii) it completes missing
ownership links by transitivity, (iii) it identi￿es cross-holdings, and (iv) it handles complex
ownership structures. These features allow us to develop robust measures of business-group
characteristics (such as group size).
We include all ownership links from the Amadeus ownership database that represent a
control relation. For this, we make the following assumptions: for private subsidiaries, a share-
holder exerts control if its direct percentage of ownership is larger than 50. For public ￿rms,
the percentage of direct ownership has to be larger than 20 to represent a control relation (since
ownership is typically less concentrated in public ￿rms than in private ￿rms).31
There are about 1 million direct ownership links that satisfy our control assumptions, where
291.974 shareholders control 789.557 subsidiaries. The average percentage of direct ownership is
91 with a median of 100 (59 percent of the ownership links represent a wholly-owned relation).
There are 1.369 public subsidiaries. For these public subsidiaries, the average percentage of
direct ownership is 53 with a median of 48. The input ￿le of direct ownership links generates
718.092 ownership chains. 69 percent of the chains include only two ￿rms (13 percent of the
chains include more than 3 ￿rms and 3 percent of the chains include more than 5 ￿rms). 63
percent of the chains are wholly-owned (for all levels in the chain). For chains where the apex in
an American or British ￿rms, 83 percent are wholly-owned, for German apex ￿rms, 60 percent
of the chains are wholly-owned, where for French apex ￿rms, only 25 percent are wholly-owned.
30Indirect ownership links are very common in our data. Suppose, for example, that ￿rm A owns 60% of the
shares of B and that B owns 60% of the shares of C. In this case, ￿rm A has a direct ownership of 60% in B
and an indirect ownership of 36% in C.
31Similar assumption was made by La Porta et al. (1999) and Faccio and Lang (2002).
43A.1.2. Description of the algorithm
The algorithm follows three steps: (i) completes missing ownership links, (ii) generates lists
of all subsidiaries and parents for each company, and (iii) constructs the ownership chains
bottom-up.32 To illustrate our methodology, it would be useful to consider the following exam-
ple. Suppose Figure A.1 correctly describes the ownership structure of a business-group. The
ultimate owner (for example, a family) at the apex of the group controls 7 public and private
￿rms. Amadeus provides detailed data on direct ownership links. Thus, our raw data include
the links A ! D, B ! F, C ! G, and D ! E. Note that the percentage of ownership for
the link C ! G has to be larger than 20 (because ￿rm G is public), where for the percentage
of ownership for all other links has to be larger than 50 (because the other subsidiaries are
private). Because there is no information about indirect ownership links, the link A ! E is
missing from the raw data. The ￿rst step of the algorithm is to complete missing links. As
we observe the ownership relations A ! D and D ! E, our algorithm infers the ownership
relation A ! E. Note that at this stage of the algorithm we still do not know whether the
ownership relation is direct or indirect (and if it is indirect, how many layers separate ￿rm E
from ￿rm A). The second step of the algorithm is to construct two lists for each ￿rm: share-
holders and subsidiaries. This step saves valuable running time, which is especially important
when dealing with large scale ownership data. The following table is generated:
Firm Shareholder Subsidiary




E A, D -
F B -
G C -
Note that from step 1, we already know that ￿rm A is a shareholder of ￿rm E. Also, because
we assume the ultimate owner is a family, ￿rms A, B, and C have no corporate (European)
shareholder. The third and ￿nal step of the algorithm is to construct the structure of the group
based on the above ownership relations. Because of the missing links problem, our algorithm
does not assume that an ownership relation is direct; the only input the algorithm receives is
the existence of the ownership relation. We start with a ￿rm that has no subsidiaries from the
list generated in step 2. We illustrate the procedure for ￿rm E, which is the most interesting
in this example. Firm E is placed at the bottom of the ownership chain. Next, we move to
the shareholder list of ￿rm E. It includes ￿rms A and D. Starting arbitrary with A, place A
above E. Proceeding to ￿rm D, there are three possibilities for its location: (i) D is above
E and above A; (ii) D is above E, but below A; (iii) D is above E, but not below neither
above A (di⁄erent ownership chain). For (i) to be the right structure, D has to appear in the
shareholder list of ￿rm A. From step 2, we rule this out. For (ii) to be the right structure,
D has to appear on the subsidiary list of ￿rm A. From step 2, this holds. Finally, for (iii) to
32Unlike business groups in East Asia (such as the Japanese keiretsu), most European business groups are
organized in pyramids (Figure A.1). This means that interlocking shareholdings are not common and, therefore,
ownership chains can be constructed bottom-up.
44be the right structure, A cannot appear on either the shareholder or subsidiary lists of ￿rm
D. From step 2, this is ruled out. At the end of this procedure, we have determined for each
ownership chain the highest shareholder ￿rm - we call this ￿rm the leading shareholder.
Our algorithm fails in the case of cross-holdings. A cross-holding is an ownership structure
where a shareholder is also a subsidiary of its own subsidiary. For example, suppose we also
observe the ownership link E ! A. Our ordering procedure will not work because there is no
starting point: no ￿rm is placed at the bottom of the business-group and, therefore, the leading
shareholder cannot be determined.33 Yet, we observe only few cases of cross-holdings in the































Figure A.1: Example of a business-group
A.1.3. Ultimate owner name matching
The next part of our algorithm groups ￿rms across ownership chains based on the name of
the ultimate owners. The name matching process deals with two main issues. First, ultimate
owner names are not standardized, i.e., the same name can be spelled di⁄erently across sub-
sidiaries. Second, common names, especially for family members, may lead to ￿ over-grouping￿ .
We deal with theses issues as following. First, we develop a name standardization procedure
that harmonizes the di⁄erent string patterns in our data. Second, to ensure families are indeed
wealthy, we search for publicly available information, such as Forbes and The Economist, on
the largest 500 wealthiest families in our sample (for example, De Rotchild family, Nasi-Agnelli
family). For the other individual ultimate owners in our sample, we compute the frequency of
the appearance of the name in the ultimate owner population. In case this frequency is higher
33A less ￿ severe￿case of cross-holding is where we observe E ! D. In this case, our algorithm constructs two
ownership chains: A ! D ! E and A ! D ! E, where both correctly characterize the ownership structure.
The leading shareholder is ￿rm A in both cases, which allows us to correctly group ￿rms into business groups.
45than the median frequency, we assume the common name problem and do not include that ul-
timate owner in our sample. Our control assumptions may lead to cases where we miss-classify
￿rms to groups. For example, suppose an ultimate owner controls 33 percent of ￿rm C, and
￿rms A and B control each 33 percent of ￿rm C. Assuming ￿rm C is private, our algorithm will
not assign ￿rm C to a group. The ultimate owner fully controls ￿rm C (via its control of ￿rms
A and B), thus ￿rm C should be part of the group. To deal with this situation we take the
following step. For ￿rms that were not assigned to groups we extract a list of their immediate
shareholders (corporate and individuals). For each shareholder we already know whether it
belongs to a group and its ultimate owner (as indicated by the ownership algorithm). Then,
we examine whether an ultimate owner controls more than 50 percent of the stocks for private
￿rms and more than 20 percent of the stocks for public ￿rms. In case the aggregated holding
of the ultimate owner meets these threshold, we assign the a¢ liate to the group.
A.2. Matching patent data
A.2.1. European Patent O¢ ce (EPO)
The matching between EPO patent applicants and Amadeus ￿rms has been a collaborative
project with the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) and the Centre for Economic Performance
(CEP). This section is a brief summary of the matching procedure.
Our main information source on patents is the 2007 publication of the PATSTAT database,
which is the standard source for European patent data. This database contains all bibliographic
data (including citations) on all European patent applications and granted patents, from the
beginning of the EPO system in 1979 to the end of 2007.
We match the name of each EPO applicant listed on the patent document to the full name
of a ￿rm listed in Amadeus (about 8 million names). Since we are interested only in matching
patent applicants to ￿rms, we exclude applicant names that fall into the following categories:
government agencies, universities, and individuals. We identify government agencies and uni-
versities by searching for a set of identifying strings in their name. We identify individuals as
patents where the assignee and the inventor name strings are identical.
The matching procedure follows two main steps. (i) Standardizing names of patent ap-
plicants. This involves replacing commonly used strings which symbolize the same thing, for
example ￿Ltd.￿and ￿Limited￿in the UK. We remove spaces between characters and transform
all letters to capital letters. As an example, the name ￿British Nuclear Fuels Public Limited
Company￿becomes ￿BRITISHNUCLEARFUELSPLC￿ . (ii) Name matching: match the stan-
dard names of the patent applicants with Amadeus ￿rms. If there is no match, then try to
match to the old ￿rm name available in Amadeus. We need to confront a number of issues.
First, in any given year, the Amadeus database excludes the names of ￿rms that have not
￿led ￿nancial reports for four consecutive years (e.g. M&A, default). We deal with this issue
in several ways. First, we use information from historical versions of the Amadeus database
(1995-2006) on names and name changes. Second, even though Amadeus contains a unique
￿rm identi￿er (BVD ID number), there are cases in which ￿rms with identical names have
di⁄erent BVD numbers. In these cases, we use other variables for identi￿cation, for exam-
ple: address (ZIP code), Date of incorporation (whether consistent with the patent application
date), and more. Finally, we manually match most of the remaining corporate patents to the
list of Amadeus ￿rms.
46Some groups assign many of their patents to a single subsidiary. This subsidiary typically
does not innovate and its main purpose is to manage the intellectual property assets of the
group. We identify such ￿rms using their SIC classi￿cation. We use information on the location
of the patent inventors to match the centrally-assigned patents to innovative a¢ liates. The
secondary assignment of these patents is based on a match between the address of the patent
inventor and the group a¢ liates. In case the address of the inventor matches multiple group
a¢ liates we make the following assumption: if only one of the a¢ liates innovates (as indicated
by the number of patents this a¢ liate already has), assign the patent to this innovative a¢ liate.
If more than one of the matched a¢ liates innovates, keep the original central assignment of
the patent. The secondary matching procedure increases the number of innovative a¢ liates by
about 250 ￿rms.
A.2.2. United States Patents and Trademarks O¢ ce (USPTO)
The procedure described above matches European ￿rms to patents registered with the EPO.
Yet, some European ￿rms register patents only with the USPTO, without applying to the
EPO. In order to identify the European ￿rms that only apply to the USPTO, we match the
complete set of Amadeus ￿rms to the name of the patent applicants from the USPTO. The
most updated patent database for the USPTO is the 2002 version of the NBER patents and
citations data archive. Because this database covers patent information only up to 2002 and our
accounting data go up to 2007, we updated the patent data ￿le by extracting all information
about patents granted between 2002 and 2007 directly from the USPTO website.34 Having
updated the USPTO patent database, we follow the matching procedure described above to
create the matched USPTO patent data for the Amadeus ￿rms.
A.3. Matching scienti￿c publications
The largest database on scienti￿c publications is the ISI Web of Knowledge (WoK) by Thomson.
This includes millions of records on publications in academic journals. The data is divided to
three main categories based on the publication type: hard sciences, social sciences, and arts
and humanities. Because we are interested in capturing investment in scienti￿c research, we
focus only on the hard sciences section of WoK. This section includes publication records over
the period 1970-2007. The address ￿eld on each record indicates the a¢ liation of the authors
of the publication. This a¢ liation is typically either a research institution or a ￿rm. We use
the name appearing in this ￿eld and match it to the complete list of Amadeus ￿rms. We follow
the same matching procedure as described above for the EPO and USPTO patent matching.
Articles may have more than one author (the median number of authors per article is 2). In
this case, the address ￿eld would include multiple a¢ liations. We assign a scienti￿c publication
to a speci￿c ￿rm if the name of this ￿rm appears at least once in the address ￿eld of the
article. This procedure means that a single article can be assigned to more than one ￿rm, but
a ￿rm cannot be assigned more than once to the same article. For each article, we also extract
information on the number of times it was cited, the journal in which it was published, and the
year of publication. Information about the importance of journals is taken from the Journal
Citations Report index (JCR). Finally, European research institutions can be incorporated,
thus, they appear in Amadeus as potential ￿rms to be matched. To screen out such ￿rms,
34http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/srchnum.htm
47we follow two steps. First, as for patent matching, we drop Amadeus names that include
strings that are associated with research institutions (such as, UNIVERSITY, RESEARCH,
INSTITUTION, etc.). Second, we manually examine the websites of ￿rms that have a large
number of publications but appear as small ￿rms in terms of their sales and number of patents.
For these ￿rms, we check whether their primary activity is research. In case the primary activity
is research, we exclude them from our matched sample.
A.4. Industry patent classi￿cation
Table 7 summarizes the distribution of patents across selected industries. The classi￿cation
of patents to these industries is based on the patent International Patent Classi￿cation, as
following. Pharmaceuticals includes IPCs A61 (excluding A61B, A61K 38, A61K 39, and
A61K 48). Biotechnology includes IPCs A01H 1/00, A01H 4/00, A61K 38/00, A61K 39/00,
A61K 48/00, C02F 3/34, C07G 11/00, C07G 13/00, C07G 15/00, C07K 4/00, C07K 14/00,
C07K 16/00, C07K 17/00, C07K 19/00, C12M, C12N, C12P, C12Q, C12S, G01N 27/327, G01N
33/53, G01N 33/54, G01N 33/55, G01N 33/57, G01N 33/68, G01N 33/74, G01N 33/76, G01N
33/78, G01N 33/88, and G01N 33/92. Computer Hardware includes G06F 13/12, G11C, G065








































Austria 382 234 174 120 54 790
(48%) (30%) (22%) (15%) (7%)
Belgium 363 141 240 156 84 744
(49%) (19%) (32%) (21%) (11%)
Denmark 177 151 138 81 57 466
(38%) (32%) (30%) (17%) (12%)
Finland 575 238 103 67 36 916
(63%) (26%) (11%) (7%) (4%)
France 884 518 962 480 482 2,364
(37%) (22%) (41%) (20%) (20%)
Germany 3,942 2,044 842 468 374 6,828
(58%) (30%) (12%) (7%) (5%)
Great Britain 2,466 1,842 672 569 103 4,980
(50%) (37%) (13%) (11%) (2%)
Greece 24 4 4 1 3 32
(75%) (13%) (13%) (3%) (9%)
Italy 2,073 699 347 139 208 3,119
(66%) (22%) (11%) (4%) (7%)
Netherlands 161 230 252 189 63 643
(25%) (36%) (39%) (29%) (10%)
Norway 349 90 88 51 37 527
(66%) (17%) (17%) (10%) (7%)
Republic of Ireland 40 20 29 25 4 89
(45%) (22%) (33%) (28%) (4%)
Spain 396 197 113 40 73 706
(56%) (28%) (16%) (6%) (10%)
Sweden 380 328 376 246 130 1,084
(35%) (30%) (35%) (23%) (12%)
Switzerland 634 582 236 165 71 1,452
(44%) (40%) (16%) (11%) (5%)
Total Europe 12,846 7,318 4,576 2,797 1,779 24,740
(52%) (30%) (18%) (11%) (7%)
United States 30,187 7,810 1,295 1,127 168 39,292
(77%) (20%) (3%) (3%) (0%)
Total 43,033 15,128 5,871 3,924 1,947 64,032
(67%) (24%) (9%) (6%) (3%)
TABLE 1: 
INNOVATION AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE ACROSS COUNTRIES
PANEL A. NUMBER OF FIRMS






Austria 684 994 763 381 382 2,441
(28%) (41%) (31%) (16%) (16%)
Belgium 309 1,736 2,600 740 1,860 4,645
(7%) (37%) (56%) (16%) (40%)
Denmark 289 2,338 1,106 477 629 3,733
(8%) (63%) (30%) (13%) (17%)
Finland 651 4,595 327 279 48 5,573
(12%) (82%) (6%) (5%) (1%)
France 801 9,487 17,077 11,832 5,245 27,365
(3%) (35%) (62%) (43%) (19%)
Germany 12,052 86,564 9,407 3,388 6,019 108,023
(11%) (80%) (9%) (3%) (6%)
Great Britain 4,775 22,581 3,752 3,596 156 31,108
(15%) (73%) (12%) (12%) (1%)
Greece 17 0 4 1 3 21
(81%) (0%) (19%) (5%) (14%)
Italy 3,246 1,295 1,222 369 853 5,763
(56%) (22%) (21%) (6%) (15%)
Netherlands 242 8,219 738 516 222 9,199
(3%) (89%) (8%) (6%) (2%)
Norway 393 131 148 121 27 672
(58%) (19%) (22%) (18%) (4%)
Republic of Ireland 61 50 138 131 7 249
(24%) (20%) (55%) (53%) (3%)
Spain 369 127 209 126 83 705
(52%) (18%) (30%) (18%) (12%)
Sweden 558 2,961 2,179 1,378 801 5,698
(10%) (52%) (38%) (24%) (14%)
Switzerland 1,272 13,237 6,102 1,582 4,520 20,611
(6%) (64%) (30%) (8%) (22%)
Total Europe 25,719 154,315 45,772 24,917 20,855 225,806
(11%) (68%) (20%) (11%) (9%)
United States 132,031 500,670 24,465 20,162 4,303 657,166
(20%) (76%) (4%) (3%) (1%)
Total 157,750 654,985 70,237 45,079 25,158 882,972
(18%) (74%) (8%) (5%) (3%)
TABLE 1: (Cont'd)
INNOVATION AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE ACROSS COUNTRIES
PANEL B. NUMBER OF USPTO PATENTS






Austria 1,646 4,006 1,570 876 694 7,222
(23%) (55%) (22%) (12%) (10%)
Belgium 1,503 1,946 3,943 1,356 2,587 7,392
(20%) (26%) (53%) (18%) (35%)
Denmark 435 4,144 2,473 992 1,481 7,052
(6%) (59%) (35%) (14%) (21%)
Finland 1,411 7,732 466 311 155 9,609
(15%) (80%) (5%) (3%) (2%)
France 2,278 20,676 23,011 11,461 11,550 45,965
(5%) (45%) (50%) (25%) (25%)
Germany 26,448 135,220 16,137 5,188 10,949 177,805
(15%) (76%) (9%) (3%) (6%)
Great Britain 5,229 30,809 3,493 2,862 631 39,531
(13%) (78%) (9%) (7%) (2%)
Greece 30 2 0 0 0 32
(94%) (6%) (0%) (0%) (0%)
Italy 5,312 3,763 3,412 1,092 2,320 12,487
(43%) (30%) (27%) (9%) (19%)
Netherlands 669 26,693 2,775 2,147 628 30,137
(2%) (89%) (9%) (7%) (2%)
Norway 1,063 263 213 107 106 1,539
(69%) (17%) (14%) (7%) (7%)
Republic of Ireland 147 51 164 155 9 362
(41%) (14%) (45%) (43%) (2%)
Spain 873 407 364 148 216 1,644
(53%) (25%) (22%) (9%) (13%)
Sweden 1,527 10,907 4,024 2,522 1,502 16,458
(9%) (66%) (24%) (15%) (9%)
Switzerland 3,160 19,587 8,292 1,595 6,697 31,039
(10%) (63%) (27%) (5%) (22%)
Total Europe 51,731 266,206 70,337 30,812 39,525 388,274
(13%) (69%) (18%) (8%) (10%)
United States 23,970 198,006 8,013 4,596 3,417 229,989
(10%) (86%) (3%) (2%) (1%)
Total 75,701 464,212 78,350 35,408 42,942 618,263
(12%) (75%) (13%) (6%) (7%)
TABLE 1: (Cont'd)
INNOVATION AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE ACROSS COUNTRIES
PANEL C. NUMBER OF EPO PATENTS






Austria 262 493 208 121 87 963
(27%) (51%) (22%) (13%) (9%)
Belgium 379 316 553 252 301 1,248
(30%) (25%) (44%) (20%) (24%)
Denmark 170 1,308 465 58 407 1,943
(9%) (67%) (24%) (3%) (21%)
Finland 326 225 166 143 23 717
(45%) (31%) (23%) (20%) (3%)
France 998 3,500 4,660 4,100 560 9,158
(11%) (38%) (51%) (45%) (6%)
Germany 4,100 12,551 4,425 741 3,684 21,076
(19%) (60%) (21%) (4%) (17%)
Great Britain 2,672 4,609 1,136 1,059 77 8,417
(32%) (55%) (13%) (13%) (1%)
Greece 19 4 2 0 2 25
(76%) (16%) (8%) (0%) (8%)
Italy 614 398 206 74 132 1,218
(50%) (33%) (17%) (6%) (11%)
Netherlands 257 1,445 634 472 162 2,336
(11%) (62%) (27%) (20%) (7%)
Norway 237 87 73 47 26 397
(60%) (22%) (18%) (12%) (7%)
Republic of Ireland 17 55 16 15 1 88
(19%) (63%) (18%) (17%) (1%)
Spain 220 90 187 66 121 497
(44%) (18%) (38%) (13%) (24%)
Sweden 278 517 504 319 185 1,299
(21%) (40%) (39%) (25%) (14%)
Switzerland 1,066 11,648 1,859 298 1,561 14,573
(7%) (80%) (13%) (2%) (11%)
Total Europe 11,615 37,246 15,094 7,765 7,329 63,955
(18%) (58%) (24%) (12%) (11%)
United States 40,362 94,142 7,206 6,075 1,131 141,710
(28%) (66%) (5%) (4%) (1%)
Total 51,977 131,388 22,300 13,840 8,460 205,665
(25%) (64%) (11%) (7%) (4%)
TABLE 1: (Cont'd)
INNOVATION AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE ACROSS COUNTRIES
PANEL D. NUMBER OF PUBLICATIONS
Conglomerate Business-GroupUltimate Owner 
Country
Private Public Total Private Public Total Private Public Total
Austria 764 26 790 1,719 722 2,441 6,096 1,126 7,222
(97%) (3%) (70%) (30%) (84%) (16%)
Belgium 711 33 744 2,482 2,163 4,645 4,466 2,926 7,392
(96%) (4%) (53%) (47%) (60%) (40%)
Denmark 443 23 466 2,067 1,666 3,733 2,859 4,193 7,052
(95%) (5%) (55%) (45%) (41%) (59%)
Finland 868 48 916 1,329 4,244 5,573 2,319 7,290 9,609
(95%) (5%) (24%) (76%) (24%) (76%)
France 2,229 135 2,364 24,988 2,377 27,365 37,746 8,219 45,965
(94%) (6%) (91%) (9%) (82%) (18%)
Germany 6,678 150 6,828 46,172 61,851 108,023 79,498 98,307 177,805
(98%) (2%) (43%) (57%) (45%) (55%)
Great Britain 4,836 144 4,980 23,108 8,000 31,108 26,594 12,937 39,531
(97%) (3%) (74%) (26%) (67%) (33%)
Greece 25 7 32 18 3 21 29 3 32
(78%) (22%) (86%) (14%) (91%) (9%)
Italy 3,075 44 3,119 5,580 183 5,763 11,652 835 12,487
(99%) (1%) (97%) (3%) (93%) (7%)
Netherlands 615 28 643 3,000 6,199 9,199 4,729 25,408 30,137
(96%) (4%) (33%) (67%) (16%) (84%)
Norway 504 23 527 482 190 672 876 663 1,539
(96%) (4%) (72%) (28%) (57%) (43%)
Republic of Ireland 87 2 89 216 33 249 336 26 362
(98%) (2%) (87%) (13%) (93%) (7%)
Spain 677 29 706 687 18 705 1,522 122 1,644
(96%) (4%) (97%) (3%) (93%) (7%)
Sweden 1,024 60 1,084 4,120 1,578 5,698 14,010 2,448 16,458
(94%) (6%) (72%) (28%) (85%) (15%)
Switzerland 1,407 45 1,452 13,710 6,901 20,611 22,251 8,788 31,039
(97%) (3%) (67%) (33%) (72%) (28%)
Total Europe 23,943 797 24,740 129,678 96,128 225,806 214,983 173,291 388,274
(97%) (3%) (57%) (43%) (55%) (45%)
United States 37,801 1,491 39,292 248,715 408,451 657,166 71,879 158,110 229,989
(96%) (4%) (38%) (62%) (31%) (69%)
Total 61,744 2,288 64,032 378,393 504,579 882,972 286,862 331,401 618,263
(96%) (4%) (43%) (57%) (46%) (54%)
TABLE 2: 
Number of Firms USPTO Patents EPO Patents







Patents USPTO Patents EPO Publications Ultimate Owner Organizational form Apex
(1) IBM Yes Yes 43,241 43,125 14,319 0 IBM Conglomerate Yes
(2) General Electric Yes Yes 22,348 21,830 9,641 93 General Electric Conglomerate Yes
(3) Eastman Kodak Yes Yes 17,441 17,157 9,676 3,361 Legg Mason Conglomerate Yes
(4) Motorola Yes Yes 17,639 16,380 4,839 2,409 Motorola Conglomerate Yes
(5) Micron Technology Yes Yes 13,986 13,986 561 119 Micron Technology Conglomerate Yes
(6) Intel Yes Yes 12,936 12,934 2,103 2,285 Intel Conglomerate Yes
(7) Texas Instruments Yes Yes 12,695 12,668 3,180 2,989 Texas Instruments Conglomerate Yes
(8) Xerox Yes Yes 12,636 12,635 4,402 3,761 Xerox Conglomerate Yes
(9) E.I. du Pont de Nemours Yes Yes 11,198 10,700 6,967 9,343 E.I. du Pont de Nemours Conglomerate Yes
(10) 3M Yes Yes 10,806 10,640 8,796 501 3M Conglomerate Yes
(11) General Motors Yes Yes 9,392 9,275 1,643 162 General Motors Conglomerate Yes
(12) Hewlett Packard Yes Yes 9,150 9,028 5,181 2,042 Hewlett Packard Conglomerate Yes
(13) Advanced Micro Systems Yes Yes 8,466 8,466 685 518 Advanced Micro Systems Conglomerate Yes
(14) Ford Motor Yes Yes 7,349 7,321 1,586 2,653 Ford Conglomerate Yes
(15) Procter & Gamble Yes Yes 7,522 6,417 8,463 2,534 Procter & Gamble Conglomerate Yes
(16) Microsoft Yes Yes 5,888 6,864 2,460 660 Microsoft Conglomerate Yes
(17) Sun Microsystems Yes Yes 6,452 5,641 2,193 472 Sun Microsystems Conglomerate Yes
(18) Boeing Yes Yes 6,072 4,981 1,384 1,307 Boeing Conglomerate Yes
(19) United Technologies Yes Yes 7,151 4,297 2,002 6 United Technologies Conglomerate Yes
(20) Applied Materials Yes Yes 3,842 3,842 1,109 0 Applied Materials Conglomerate Yes
TABLE 3:







Patents USPTO Patents EPO Publications Ultimate Owner Organizational form Apex
(1) Imperial Chemical Industries Yes Yes 4,147 3,178 2,410 0 Imperial Chemical Industries Conglomerate Yes
(2) Rolls Royce Yes Yes 1,288 1,242 805 379 Rolls Royce Conglomerate Yes
(3) British Telecommunications Yes Yes 1,074 1,073 1,848 0 British Telecommunications Conglomerate Yes
(4) Beecham Group No Yes 3,326 743 801 0 GlaxoSmithKline Conglomerate No
(5) BOC Yes Yes 692 686 504 4 BOC Conglomerate Yes
(6) British Technology Group Yes Yes 590 590 1,201 2 BTG Conglomerate Yes
(7) BP Chemicals No Yes 4,917 583 728 0 BP Conglomerate No
(8) Glaxo Group No Yes 3,326 506 1,377 0 GlaxoSmithKline Conglomerate No
(9) The British Petroleum Yes Yes 4,917 499 531 0 BP Conglomerate Yes
(10) SmithKline Beecham No Yes 3,326 440 1,101 5 GlaxoSmithKline Conglomerate No
(11) Johnson Matthey Yes Yes 314 300 384 24 Johnson Metthey Conglomerate Yes
(12) Merck Sharp & Dohme No Yes 4,408 300 323 107 Merck Conglomerate No
(13) Smiths Industries No Yes 530 293 141 0 Smiths Group Conglomerate No
(14) Molins Yes Yes 293 287 78 0 Molins Stand Alone Yes
(15) British Gas No Yes 274 274 211 0 Centrica Business-Group, Wholly-Owned  No
(16) John Wyeth & Brother No Yes 1,957 253 77 7 Wyeth Conglomerate No
(17) Renishaw Yes Yes 215 214 308 9 Renishaw Conglomerate Yes
(18) ARM Yes Yes 272 184 64 12 ARM Conglomerate Yes
(19) BAE Systems Yes Yes 490 128 282 0 BAE Systems Conglomerate Yes
(20) Qinetiq Yes Yes 245 122 489 0 Qinetiq Conglomerate Yes
TABLE 3: (Cont'd)









Patents EPO Publications Ultimate Owner Organizational form Apex
(1) L'Oreal Yes Yes 4,882 3,135 4,066 0 Nestlé Business-Group, Partly-Owned  No
(2) Thales Yes No 2,652 2,604 3,438 0 TSA Business-Group, Partly-Owned  No
(3) Valeo Yes Yes 890 586 291 1 Valeo Conglomerate Yes
(4) France Telecom Yes Yes 543 525 1,839 1 France Telecom Conglomerate Yes
(5) Thomson Licensing No Yes 536 498 2,671 0 Thomson Conglomerate No
(6) Hutchinson No Yes 383 259 509 1 Total Business-Group, Wholly-Owned  No
(7) Rhone Poulnec Biochimie No Yes 6,465 187 6 0 Sanofi Aventis Conglomerate No
(8) Automobiles Peugeot No No 219 150 1,177 0 ETS Peugeot-Frères Business-Group, Partly-Owned  No
(9) Valois No Yes 203 128 248 0 Aptargroup Conglomerate No
(10) ELA Medical No No 245 123 96 0 Fingruppo Business-Group, Partly-Owned  No
(11) Airbus France No Yes 565 112 353 9 Lagardere Business-Group, Partly-Owned  No
(12) Nexans Yes Yes 131 105 344 0 Nexans Conglomerate Yes
(13) Saint Gobain Glass France No Yes 469 102 475 0 Saint Gobain Business-Group, Wholly-Owned  No
(14) Kuhn No Yes 121 95 279 0 Bucher Industries Conglomerate No
(15) Gaz De France Yes Yes 88 88 211 2 Gaz De France Conglomerate Yes
(16) Valeo Vision No Yes 890 84 598 0 Valeo Business-Group, Wholly-Owned  No
(17) Somfy No No 91 82 219 0 J.P.J Holding company Business-Group, Partly-Owned  No
(18) Valeo Equipment Electriques Moteur No Yes 890 81 296 0 Valeo Business-Group, Wholly-Owned  No
(19) Transgene Yes No 67 67 137 331 TSGH Stand Alone No
(20) Gemplus No Yes 68 64 325 9 Gemalto Business-Group, Partly-Owned  No
TABLE 3: (Cont'd)







Patents USPTO Patents EPO Publications Ultimate Owner Organizational form Apex
(1) Siemens Yes Yes 31,999 29,156 52,566 4,263 Siemens Conglomerate Yes
(2) Robert Bosch Stiftung No No 10,437 10,437 13,832 10 Robert Bosch Stiftung Conglomerate Yes
(3) Bayer Yes Yes 11,501 9,969 10,913 0 Bayer Conglomerate Yes
(4) BASF Yes Yes 9,659 9,009 11,331 2,654 BASF Conglomerate Yes
(5) Hoechst No Yes 6,465 5,364 5,868 2,600 Sanofi Aventis Conglomerate No
(6) Infineon Technologies Yes Yes 4,107 3,914 4,044 0 Infineon Technologies Conglomerate Yes
(7) DaimlerChrysler Yes Yes 1,903 1,894 2,241 7 Daimler Conglomerate Yes
(8) Heidelberger Druckmaschinen Yes Yes 1,755 1,748 1,138 4 Heidelberger Druckmaschinen Conglomerate Yes
(9) Henkel Yes Yes 1,565 1,438 4,008 14 Henkel Stand Alone Yes
(10) Atecs Mannesmann No Yes 1,408 1,408 1,186 0 Vodafone Stand Alone No
(11) AGFA Gevaert Yes Yes 2,850 1,049 742 51 KBC Group Conglomerate No
(12) Porsche Yes Yes 1,492 903 26 4 Porsche Conglomerate Yes
(13) ZF Friedrichshafen No No 881 865 1,031 6 Zeppelin Stiftung Business-Group, Partly-Owned  No
(14) Man Roland Druckmaschinen No Yes 928 822 1,263 1 Allianz SE Business-Group, Partly-Owned  No
(15) Wacker Chemie Yes No 922 728 1,019 0 Dr Alexander Wacker Business-Group, Partly-Owned  No
(16) BMW Yes Yes 708 708 2,866 0 BMW Conglomerate Yes
(17) Schering No Yes 11,501 552 1,116 2,217 Bayer Conglomerate No
(18) Degussa No Yes 630 548 894 6 RWE Business-Group, Partly-Owned  No
(19) Alfred Teves No Yes 698 485 80 0 Continental Conglomerate No
(20) Volkswagen Yes Yes 1,492 440 0 140 Porsche Business-Group, Partly-Owned  No
TABLE 3: (Cont'd)







Patents USPTO Patents EPO Publications Ultimate Owner Type of Ownership Apex
(1) Montedison No Yes 396 396 251 88 State of France Business-Group, Partly-Owned  No
(2) Biofarmitalia No No 336 336 148 0 Biofarmitalia Stand Alone Yes
(3) Fiat Auto No No 306 237 784 7 Giovanni Agnelli & C. Business-Group, Partly-Owned  No
(4) Gruppo Lepetit No Yes 6,465 133 67 46 Sanofi Aventis Business-Group, Partly-Owned  No
(5) Zambon Group No No 108 108 121 1 Zambon Business-Group, Wholly-Owned  No
(6) GD No No 96 96 123 0 GD Conglomerate Yes
(7) Indena No No 94 93 134 62 IdB Holding Business-Group, Wholly-Owned  No
(8) SKF Industrie No Yes 345 57 115 0 SKF Conglomerate No
(9) Arturo Salice No No 47 47 125 0 Giorgio E Luicano Salice Stand Alone No
(10) Solvay Solexis No Yes 253 45 273 2 Solvac Business-Group, Partly-Owned  No
(11) Chiesi Farmaceutici No No 46 45 116 3 Chiesi Farmaceutici Conglomerate Yes
(12) Snamprogetti No Yes 163 37 47 91 Eni Business-Group, Wholly-Owned  No
(13) Claber No No 37 37 1 0 Claber Stand Alone Yes
(14) Dideco No No 245 33 26 11 Fingruppo Business-Group, Partly-Owned  No
(15) Magneti Marelli PowerTrain No No 306 32 126 0 Giovanni Agnelli & C. Business-Group, Partly-Owned  No
(16) Lonati No No 66 32 42 0 Lonati Conglomerate Yes
(17) Italfarmaco No No 34 31 31 41 Italfarmaco Holding Business-Group, Wholly-Owned  No
(18) Eni Yes Yes 163 30 123 5 Eni Conglomerate Yes
(19) ACRAF No No 30 29 49 0 APO Conerpo Business-Group, Partly-Owned  No
(20) Esaote No Yes 40 27 9 0 Intesa Sanpaolo Business-Group, Partly-Owned  No
TABLE 3: (Cont'd)
PANEL E. TOP 20 INNOVATING ITALIAN FIRMSLower 25% Top 25% Lower 25% Top 25%




% Partly-owned Affiliates 20.6% 1.6% 9.3% 1.5% 1.5% 11.2%
Partly-owned / Conglomerates 0.58 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.17
Standalones / Conglomerates 0.87 0.13 0.20 0.13 0.13 0.20
Partly-owned / Standalones 0.66 0.14 0.65 0.14 0.14 0.84
% Public  18.0% 63.1% 51.8% 63.5% 63.5% 46.0%
Lower 25% Top 25% Lower 25% Top 25%




% Partly-owned Affiliates 24.1% 0.7% 9.4% 0.6% 0.6% 10.6%
Partly-owned / Conglomerates 0.77 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.16
Standalones / Conglomerates 1.06 0.26 0.16 0.26 0.26 0.16
Partly-owned / Stand Alones 0.73 0.03 0.80 0.03 0.03 0.99
% Public 23.9% 60.4% 51.6% 60.5% 60.5% 45.3%
Lower 25% Top 25% Lower 25% Top 25%




% Partly-owned Affiliates 15.1% 0.9% 14.6% 0.8% 0.8% 13.1%
Partly-owned / Conglomerates 0.43 0.01 0.22 0.01 0.01 0.22
Standalones / Conglomerates 1.05 0.44 0.24 0.44 0.44 0.27
Partly-owned / Stand Alones 0.41 0.03 0.92 0.03 0.03 0.81
% Public 14.9% 63.5% 58.8% 63.6% 63.6% 61.9%
TABLE 4: 
COMPARING ORGANIZATIONAL FORM BY COUNTRY FINANCIAL AND LEGAL CONDITIONS
Market Capitalization Minority Shareholders Protection U.S. & U.K. vs. Con. Europe
Notes: This table examines the distribution of organizational form by country financial and legal conditions. For Market Capitalization, We rank 
countries according to the three-year average ratio of stock-market traded value to GDP, based on Beck et al. (2000, 2007). We use the anti-
directive index developed by La Porta et al. (1997) to rank countries according to the strength of minority shareholders protection. The business-
group category includes only partly-owned affiliates.
PANEL A. EPO PATENTS
Market Capitalization Minority Shareholders Protection U.S. & U.K. vs. Con. Europe
PANEL B. USPTO PATENTS
PANEL C. SCIENTIFIC PUBLICATIONS
Market Capitalization Minority Shareholders Protection U.S. & U.K. vs. Con. EuropeUltimate owner 
Country:







Austria 41 624 2 0 2 667 19 147 3 2 1 169
(6%) (94%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (11%) (87%) (2%) (1%) (1%)
Belgium 46 11 191 135 56 248 39 11 30 15 15 80
(19%) (4%) (77%) (54%) (23%) (49%) (14%) (38%) (19%) (19%)
Denmark 31 404 97 4 93 532 27 315 508 22 486 850
(6%) (76%) (18%) (1%) (17%) (3%) (37%) (60%) (3%) (57%)
Finland 63 64 0 0 0 127 51 10 6 6 0 67
(50%) (50%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (76%) (15%) (9%) (9%) (0%)
France 132 1,296 284 115 169 1,712 134 522 124 46 78 780
(8%) (76%) (17%) (7%) (10%) (17%) (67%) (16%) (6%) (10%)
Germany 919 2,053 348 74 274 3,320 446 868 194 12 182 1,508
(28%) (62%) (10%) (2%) (8%) (30%) (58%) (13%) (1%) (12%)
Great Britain 190 4,732 229 156 73 5,151 179 1,457 160 122 38 1,796
(4%) (92%) (4%) (3%) (1%) (10%) (81%) (9%) (7%) (2%)
Greece 7 0 0 0 0 7 - - -
(100%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%)
Italy 420 212 79 5 74 711 101 20 24 1 23 145
(59%) (30%) (11%) (1%) (10%) (70%) (14%) (17%) (1%) (16%)
Netherlands 85 205 24 17 7 314 50 104 10 7 3 164
(27%) (65%) (8%) (5%) (2%) (30%) (63%) (6%) (4%) (2%)
Norway 26 5 17 8 9 48 26 1 8 6 2 35
(54%) (10%) (35%) (17%) (19%) (74%) (3%) (23%) (17%) (6%)
Republic of Ireland 11 19 52 52 0 82 0 0 15 15 0 15
(13%) (23%) (63%) (63%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (100%) (100%) (0%)
Spain 175 13 44 14 30 232 11 7 6 3 3 24
(75%) (6%) (19%) (6%) (13%) (46%) (29%) (25%) (13%) (13%)
Sweden 40 57 139 77 62 236 2 31 36 5 31 64
(17%) (24%) (59%) (33%) (26%) (3%) (48%) (56%) (8%) (48%)
Switzerland 134 1,980 538 75 463 2,652 28 973 714 22 692 1,715
(5%) (75%) (20%) (3%) (17%) (2%) (57%) (42%) (1%) (40%)
Total Europe 2,320 11,675 2,044 732 1,312 16,039 1,113 4,466 1,838 284 1,554 7,417
(14%) (73%) (13%) (5%) (8%) (15%) (60%) (25%) (4%) (21%)
United States 1,487 7,361 327 222 105 9,175 1,271 2,971 204 184 20 4,446
(16%) (80%) (4%) (2%) (1%) (29%) (67%) (5%) (4%) (0%)
Total 3,807 19,036 2,371 954 1,417 25,214 2,384 7,437 2,042 468 1,574 11,863
(15%) (75%) (9%) (4%) (6%) (20%) (63%) (17%) (4%) (13%)
Pharmaceuticals Biotechnology
Conglomerate Conglomerate
INNOVATION AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE ACROSS COUNTRIES AND SELECTED INDUSTRIES: NUMBER OF EPO PATENTS
TABLE 5: 
Business-Group Business-GroupUltimate owner 
Country:







Austria 9 7 2 2 0 18 34 10 1 1 0 45
(50%) (39%) (11%) (11%) (0%) (76%) (22%) (2%) (2%) (0%)
Belgium 5 1 3 2 1 9 65 95 93 3 90 253
(56%) (11%) (33%) (22%) (11%) (26%) (38%) (37%) (1%) (1000%)
Denmark 3 3 2 1 1 8 0 20 3 2 1 23
(38%) (38%) (25%) (13%) (13%) (0%) (87%) (13%) (9%) (13%)
Finland 19 156 11 2 9 186 60 3,104 19 3 16 3,183
(10%) (84%) (6%) (1%) (5%) (2%) (98%) (1%) (0%) (9%)
France 27 214 176 100 76 417 121 3,852 2,767 2,145 622 6,740
(6%) (51%) (42%) (24%) (18%) (2%) (57%) (41%) (32%) (149%)
Germany 64 1,060 38 11 27 1,162 373 6,059 217 129 88 6,649
(6%) (91%) (3%) (1%) (2%) (6%) (91%) (3%) (2%) (8%)
Great Britain 79 69 18 13 5 166 163 318 89 68 21 570
(48%) (42%) (11%) (8%) (3%) (29%) (56%) (16%) (12%) (13%)
Italy 5 11 5 1 4 21 55 193 54 42 12 302
(24%) (52%) (24%) (5%) (19%) (18%) (64%) (18%) (14%) (57%)
Netherlands 1 424 33 21 12 458 0 4,759 180 98 82 4,939
(0%) (93%) (7%) (5%) (3%) (0%) (96%) (4%) (2%) (18%)
Norway 11 3 0 0 0 14 55 45 2 2 0 102
(79%) (21%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (54%) (44%) (2%) (2%) (0%)
Republic of Ireland 2 0 0 0 0 2 5 1 0 0 0 6
(100%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (83%) (17%) (0%) (0%) (0%)
Spain 1 0 3 0 3 4 10 22 16 12 4 48
(25%) (0%) (75%) (0%) (75%) (21%) (46%) (33%) (25%) (100%)
Sweden 7 117 9 6 3 133 20 2,845 77 70 7 2,942
(5%) (88%) (7%) (5%) (2%) (1%) (97%) (3%) (2%) (5%)
Switzerland 8 15 11 1 10 34 124 150 14 9 5 288
(24%) (44%) (32%) (3%) (29%) (43%) (52%) (5%) (3%) (15%)
Total Europe 241 2,080 311 160 151 2,632 1,085 21,473 3,532 2,584 948 26,090
(9%) (79%) (12%) (6%) (6%) (4%) (82%) (14%) (10%) (4%)
United States 393 3,796 43 40 3 4,232 1,259 12,813 135 102 33 14,207
(9%) (90%) (1%) (1%) (0%) (9%) (90%) (1%) (1%) (0%)
Total 634 5,876 354 200 154 6,864 2,344 34,286 3,667 2,686 981 40,297
(9%) (86%) (5%) (3%) (2%) (6%) (85%) (9%) (7%) (2%)
Conglomerate Conglomerate
INNOVATION AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE ACROSS COUNTRIES AND SELECTED INDUSTRIES: NUMBER OF EPO PATENTS
TABLE 5: (Cont'd)
Telecommunications Computer Hardware
Business-Group Business-GroupVariable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Weighted Citations per patent 0.111 *** 522,437 1.231 2.654 31,645 1.120 2.292
Weighted Citations per patent - 3 year window 0.065 *** 515,961 1.208 2.689 31,254 1.143 2.464
Weighted Citations per patent - 5 year window 0.084 *** 515,961 1.224 2.635 31,254 1.140 2.342
Weighted Self citations per patent - 5 year window 0.592 *** 515,961 1.567 5.173 31,254 0.975 3.539
Generality 0.012 *** 254,863 0.278 0.282 16,015 0.266 0.278
Originality 0.010 *** 385,689 0.274 0.284 22,985 0.264 0.282
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Weighted Citations per patent -0.169 *** 117,884 0.713 2.015 40,370 0.883 2.050
Weighted Citations per patent - 3 year window -0.161 *** 116,414 0.772 2.155 39,806 0.932 2.172
Weighted Citations per patent - 5 year window -0.162 *** 116,414 0.759 2.074 39,806 0.920 2.091
Weighted Self citations per patent - 5 year window -0.019 116,414 0.598 2.570 39,806 0.617 2.778
Generality -0.033 *** 47,125 0.231 0.273 18,757 0.264 0.281
Originality -0.013 *** 75,341 0.226 0.273 27,468 0.239 0.277
Cong - BG
TABLE 6:
COMPARISON OF MEANS: CONGLOMERATES VS. BUSINESS-GROUPS
Conglomerates Business-Groups
Panel A. United States & Great Britain
Panel B. Continental Europe
Conglomerates Business-Groups
Cong - BG
Notes: This table reports mean comparison tests for measures of patent quality between conglomerates and partly-owned business group affiliates. The
unit of observation is patents from the USPTO over the period 1969-2007. Self citations are citations where the citing firm cites one of its predecessor
patents. Generality is defined as one minus the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of the concentration of the citations a patent receives across three-digit
technology fields. Originality is defined as one minus the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of the concentration of the citations a patent receives across three-
digit technology fields. *** indicates that the difference in means in significant at the one percent level.Ultimate owner 
Country:







Austria 1,646 4,006 1,570 876 694 7,222 112,331 282,728 184,851 149,687 35,165 579,910
(23%) (55%) (22%) (12%) (10%) (19%) (49%) (32%) (26%) (6%)
Belgium 1,503 1,946 3,943 1,356 2,587 7,392 318,930 270,565 281,023 149,940 131,083 870,518
(20%) (26%) (53%) (18%) (35%) (37%) (31%) (32%) (17%) (15%)
Denmark 435 4,144 2,473 992 1,481 7,052 65,155 57,801 110,935 68,324 42,611 233,890
(6%) (59%) (35%) (14%) (21%) (28%) (25%) (47%) (29%) (18%)
Finland 1,411 7,732 466 311 155 9,609 157,591 341,274 94,689 46,669 48,020 593,554
(15%) (80%) (5%) (3%) (2%) (27%) (57%) (16%) (8%) (8%)
France 2,278 20,676 23,011 11,461 11,550 45,965 983,506 2,426,349 3,142,541 1,096,336 2,046,205 6,552,396
(5%) (45%) (50%) (25%) (25%) (15%) (37%) (48%) (17%) (31%)
Germany 26,448 135,220 16,137 5,188 10,949 177,805 3,184,594 4,179,662 1,979,268 745,130 1,234,138 9,343,524
(15%) (76%) (9%) (3%) (6%) (34%) (45%) (21%) (8%) (13%)
Great Britain 5,229 30,809 3,493 2,862 631 39,531 1,004,820 4,006,807 1,910,309 1,383,107 527,202 6,921,935
(13%) (78%) (9%) (7%) (2%) (15%) (58%) (28%) (20%) (8%)
Greece 30 2 0 0 0 32 92,488 45,221 31,725 8,216 23,509 169,434
(94%) (6%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (55%) (27%) (19%) (5%) (14%)
Italy 5,312 3,763 3,412 1,092 2,320 12,487 1,251,114 515,623 463,700 262,265 201,436 2,230,437
(43%) (30%) (27%) (9%) (19%) (56%) (23%) (21%) (12%) (9%)
Netherlands 669 26,693 2,775 2,147 628 30,137 692,932 891,044 742,451 512,979 229,472 2,326,426
(2%) (89%) (9%) (7%) (2%) (30%) (38%) (32%) (22%) (10%)
Norway 1,063 263 213 107 106 1,539 273,878 247,768 161,400 89,753 71,647 683,045
(69%) (17%) (14%) (7%) (7%) (40%) (36%) (24%) (13%) (10%)
Republic of Ireland 147 51 164 155 9 362 326,369 146,663 58,731 50,586 8,145 531,762
(41%) (14%) (45%) (43%) (2%) (61%) (28%) (11%) (10%) (2%)
Spain 873 407 364 148 216 1,644 934,822 887,995 688,147 201,559 486,588 2,510,965
(53%) (25%) (22%) (9%) (13%) (37%) (35%) (27%) (8%) (19%)
Sweden 1,527 10,907 4,024 2,522 1,502 16,458 211,686 488,545 498,265 274,883 223,381 1,198,495
(9%) (66%) (24%) (15%) (9%) (18%) (41%) (42%) (23%) (19%)
Switzerland 3,160 19,587 8,292 1,595 6,697 31,039 204,994 976,556 319,395 131,275 188,120 1,500,944
(10%) (63%) (27%) (5%) (22%) (14%) (65%) (21%) (9%) (13%)
Total Europe 51,731 266,206 70,337 30,812 39,525 388,274 9,815,208 15,764,599 10,667,428 5,170,707 5,496,721 36,247,235
(13%) (69%) (18%) (8%) (10%) (27%) (43%) (29%) (14%) (15%)
United States 23,970 198,006 8,013 4,596 3,417 229,989 8,811,427 21,377,492 2,763,126 2,147,748 615,378 32,952,045
(10%) (86%) (3%) (2%) (1%) (27%) (65%) (8%) (7%) (2%)
Total 75,701 464,212 78,350 35,408 42,942 618,263 18,626,635 37,142,091 13,430,554 7,318,455 6,112,099 69,199,280
(12%) (75%) (13%) (6%) (7%) (27%) (54%) (19%) (11%) (9%)
Business-Group Business-Group
TABLE 7:
PANEL A: INCLUDING NON-INNOVATING FIRMS
EPO Patents Sales ($M)Ultimate owner 
Country:







Austria 60 771 5 2 3 836 4,048 3,448 104 104 0 7,600
(7%) (92%) (1%) (0%) (0%) (53%) (45%) (1%) (1%) (0%)
Belgium 85 22 221 150 71 328 15,034 1,504 16,627 13,342 3,285 33,164
(26%) (7%) (67%) (46%) (22%) (45%) (5%) (50%) (40%) (10%)
Denmark 58 719 605 26 579 1,382 800 2,507 2,510 933 1,576 5,817
(4%) (52%) (44%) (2%) (42%) (14%) (43%) (43%) (16%) (27%)
Finland 114 74 6 6 0 194 3,588 1,289 54 4 50 4,931
(59%) (38%) (3%) (3%) (0%) (73%) (26%) (1%) (0%) (1%)
France 266 1,818 408 161 247 2,492 17,941 102,218 13,406 3,462 9,944 133,564
(11%) (73%) (16%) (6%) (10%) (13%) (77%) (10%) (3%) (7%)
Germany 1,365 2,921 542 86 456 4,828 56,465 150,206 36,877 2,577 34,300 243,548
(28%) (61%) (11%) (2%) (9%) (23%) (62%) (15%) (1%) (14%)
Great Britain 369 6,189 389 278 111 6,947 8,832 162,238 4,868 4,049 819 175,939
(5%) (89%) (6%) (4%) (2%) (5%) (92%) (3%) (2%) (0%)
Greece 7 0 0 0 0 7 6,172 93 227 0 227 6,493
(100%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (95%) (1%) (3%) (0%) (3%)
Italy 521 232 103 6 97 856 28,844 3,279 7,471 650 6,822 39,594
(61%) (27%) (12%) (1%) (11%) (73%) (8%) (19%) (2%) (17%)
Netherlands 135 309 34 24 10 478 10,472 24,164 4,629 3,449 1,180 39,265
(28%) (65%) (7%) (5%) (2%) (27%) (62%) (12%) (9%) (3%)
Norway 52 6 25 14 11 83 1,786 523 1,035 964 71 3,343
(63%) (7%) (30%) (17%) (13%) (53%) (16%) (31%) (29%) (2%)
Republic of Ireland 11 19 67 67 0 97 7,021 3,349 1,937 431 1,507 12,308
(11%) (20%) (69%) (69%) (0%) (57%) (27%) (16%) (3%) (12%)
Spain 186 20 50 17 33 256 22,921 20,705 5,385 1,124 4,261 49,011
(73%) (8%) (20%) (7%) (13%) (47%) (42%) (11%) (2%) (9%)
Sweden 42 88 175 82 93 305 5,524 1,799 5,652 3,338 2,315 12,975
(14%) (29%) (57%) (27%) (30%) (43%) (14%) (44%) (26%) (18%)
Switzerland 162 2,953 1,252 97 1,155 4,367 8,161 95,671 8,323 1,298 7,025 112,155
(4%) (68%) (29%) (2%) (26%) (7%) (85%) (7%) (1%) (6%)
Total Europe 3,433 16,141 3,882 1,016 2,866 23,456 197,609 572,993 109,105 35,725 73,380 879,706
(15%) (69%) (17%) (4%) (12%) (22%) (65%) (12%) (4%) (8%)
United States 2,758 10,332 531 406 125 13,621 62,035 841,708 33,146 21,696 11,450 936,889
(20%) (76%) (4%) (3%) (1%) (7%) (90%) (4%) (2%) (1%)
Total 6,191 26,473 4,413 1,422 2,991 37,077 259,643 1,414,701 142,251 57,421 84,830 1,816,595
(17%) (71%) (11.9%) (4%) (8%) (14%) (78%) (7.8%) (3%) (5%)
Business-Group Business-Group
TABLE 7:
EPO Patents Sales ($M)
PANEL B: INCLUDING NON-INNOVATING FIRMS - PHARMACEUTICALS AND BIOTECHNOLOGYUltimate owner 
Country:







Austria 34 10 1 1 0 45 243 213 152 152 0 607
(76%) (22%) (2%) (2%) (0%) (40%) (35%) (25%) (25%) (0%)
Belgium 65 95 93 3 90 253 130 1,687 28 28 0 1,845
(26%) (38%) (37%) (1%) (36%) (7%) (91%) (2%) (2%) (0%)
Denmark 0 20 3 2 1 23 63 81 567 567 0 711
(0%) (87%) (13%) (9%) (4%) (9%) (11%) (80%) (80%) (0%)
Finland 60 3,104 19 3 16 3,183 936 58,720 895 0 895 60,551
(2%) (98%) (1%) (0%) (1%) (2%) (97%) (1%) (0%) (1%)
France 121 3,852 2,767 2,145 622 6,740 1,315 1,599 28,200 21,665 6,535 31,114
(2%) (57%) (41%) (32%) (9%) (4%) (5%) (91%) (70%) (21%)
Germany 373 6,059 217 129 88 6,649 5,293 2,710 16,408 15,953 455 24,410
(6%) (91%) (3%) (2%) (1%) (22%) (11%) (67%) (65%) (2%)
Great Britain 163 318 89 68 21 570 663 66,360 5,328 2,528 2,800 72,350
(29%) (56%) (16%) (12%) (4%) (1%) (92%) (7%) (3%) (4%)
Greece - - - - - - 143 0 138 0 138 282
(51%) (0%) (49%) (0%) (49%)
Italy 55 193 54 42 12 302 4,567 271 1,067 814 254 5,905
(18%) (64%) (18%) (14%) (4%) (77%) (5%) (18%) (14%) (4%)
Netherlands 0 4,759 180 98 82 4,939 0 360 515 512 3 875
(0%) (96%) (4%) (2%) (2%) (0%) (41%) (59%) (59%) (0%)
Norway 55 45 2 2 0 102 572 227 114 95 19 914
(54%) (44%) (2%) (2%) (0%) (63%) (25%) (12%) (10%) (2%)
Republic of Ireland 5 1 0 0 0 6 39 0 0 0 0 39
(83%) (17%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (100%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%)
Spain 10 22 16 12 4 48 3,813 305 803 110 693 4,921
(21%) (46%) (33%) (25%) (8%) (77%) (6%) (16%) (2%) (14%)
Sweden 20 2,845 77 70 7 2,942 90 13,899 181 148 33 14,169
(1%) (97%) (3%) (2%) (0%) (1%) (98%) (1%) (1%) (0%)
Switzerland 124 150 14 9 5 288 193 359 38 38 0 589
(43%) (52%) (5%) (3%) (2%) (33%) (61%) (6%) (6%) (0%)
Total Europe 1,085 21,473 3,532 2,584 948 26,090 18,060 146,790 54,432 42,609 11,824 219,283
(4%) (82%) (14%) (10%) (4%) (8%) (67%) (25%) (19%) (5%)
United States 1,259 12,813 135 102 33 14,207 126,781 773,582 11,632 6,809 4,822 911,994
(9%) (90%) (1%) (1%) (0%) (14%) (85%) (1%) (1%) (1%)
Total 2,344 34,286 3,667 2,686 981 40,297 144,841 920,372 66,064 49,418 16,646 1,131,277
(6%) (85%) (9%) (7%) (2%) (13%) (81%) (6%) (4%) (1%)
Business-Group Business-Group
TABLE 7:
EPO Patents Sales ($M)












# of patenting 
subsidiaries
(1) IBM USA 91,400 355,766 Public 43,241 14,576 925 198 31
(2) Siemens Germany 110,820 427,000 Public 31,999 55,190 4,357 578 101
(3) General Electric USA 163,000 319,000 Public 22,348 10,116 237 1,271 72
(4) Motorola USA 15,800 24,568 Public 17,639 5,359 2,462 76 23
(5) Eastman Kodak USA 10,301 26,900 Public 17,441 9,954 3,371 30 5
(6) Micron Technology USA 5,688 23,500 Public 13,986 561 128 11 3
(7) Intel USA 37,600 83,900 Public 12,936 2,104 2,291 31 4
(8) Texas Instruments USA 14,300 30,986 Public 12,695 3,212 2,992 24 5
(9) Xerox USA 12,200 20,355 Public 12,636 4,403 3,761 156 3
(10) Bayer Germany 32,918 180,600 Public 11,501 13,322 2,592 146 44
(11) E.I. Du Pont De Nemours USA 29,000 59,000 Public 11,198 7,044 9,398 122 17
(12) 3M USA 22,900 75,333 Public 10,806 8,971 532 97 13
(13) Robert Bosch Stiftung Germany 46,320 271,000 Private 10,437 13,832 10 5 1
(14) BASF Germany 69,600 87,413 Public 9,659 11,993 2,691 187 26
(15) General Motors USA 207,000 280,000 Public 9,392 2,319 189 260 9
(16) Hewlett Packard USA 10,400 172,000 Public 9,150 6,798 3,606 151 46
(17) Alcatel-Lucent France 19,400 46,096 Public 8,567 7,272 3,659 138 43
(18) Advanced Micro Devices USA 5,649 10,626 Public 8,466 685 518 17 1
(19) Procter & Gamble USA 76,500 138,000 Public 7,522 9,138 2,645 221 17
(20) Ford Motor USA 160,000 283,000 Public 7,349 3,195 2,807 67 18
TABLE A1:












# of patenting 
subsidiaries
(1) Bayer Germany 32,918 180,600 Public 11,501 13,322 2,592 146 44
(2) 3M USA 22,900 75,333 Public 10,806 8,971 532 97 13
(3) BASF Germany 69,600 87,413 Public 9,659 11,993 2,691 187 26
(4) Procter & Gamble USA 76,500 138,000 Public 7,522 9,138 2,645 221 17
(5) Sanofi Aventis France 22,300 52,096 Public 6,465 7,369 2,954 137 27
(6) Pfizer USA 48,400 98,000 Public 5,314 4,475 5,145 147 28
(7) Roche Switzerland 10,900 40,689 Public 3,832 4,940 8,755 72 29
(8) Johnson & Johnson USA 53,300 122,200 Public 3,570 2,583 664 186 99
(9) Abbott Laboratories USA 22,500 66,663 Public 3,476 2,020 4,619 81 14
(10) Glaxosmithkline Great Britain 36,400 76,573 Public 3,326 5,432 515 142 25
(11) Eli Lilly USA 15,700 41,500 Public 3,246 2,437 5,526 40 8
(12) Wyeth USA 20,400 50,060 Public 1,957 795 55 48 8
(13) Novartis Switzerland 12,800 65,257 Public 1,703 3,638 3,330 143 30
(14) Henkel Germany 16,900 21,716 Public 1,565 4,155 23 39 10
(15) Novo Nordisk Denmark 904 22,590 Public 1,456 3,132 1,137 35 10
(16) Astrazeneca Great Britain 28,300 30,986 Public 1,366 2,430 682 76 22
(17) Schering Plough USA 18,502 50,000 Public 1,275 1,004 1,243 50 5
(18) Allergan USA 3,900 5,389 Public 945 548 132 22 6
(19) CH Boehringer Sohn Germany 14,300 37,723 Private 744 1,437 1,281 47 18
(20) BTG Great Britain 139 95 Public 590 1,201 2 10 1
TABLE A1:
PANEL B: TOP 20 INNOVATING CORPORATIONS - PHARMACEUTICALSGroup name
Country of 
ultimate owner
Sales (M, $) # of employees Public Patents USPTO Patents EPO Publications
# of 
subsidiaries
# of patenting 
subsidiaries
(1) Bayer Germany 32,918 180,600 Public 11,501 13,322 2,592 146 44
(2) E.I. Du Pont De Nemours USA 29,000 59,000 Public 11,198 7,044 9,398 122 17
(3) BASF Germany 69,600 87,413 Public 9,659 11,993 2,691 187 26
(4) Sanofi Aventis France 22,300 52,096 Public 6,465 7,369 2,954 137 27
(5) Pfizer USA 48,400 98,000 Public 5,314 4,475 5,145 147 28
(6) Roche Switzerland 10,900 40,689 Public 3,832 4,940 8,755 72 29
(7) Abbott Laboratories USA 22,500 66,663 Public 3,476 2,020 4,619 81 14
(8) Glaxosmithkline Great Britain 36,400 76,573 Public 3,326 5,432 515 142 25
(9) Eli Lilly USA 15,700 41,500 Public 3,246 2,437 5,526 40 8
(10) Monsanto USA 8,563 18,800 Public 2,961 872 2,095 24 9
(11) Novartis Switzerland 12,800 65,257 Public 1,703 3,638 3,330 143 30
(12) Becton Dickinson USA 6,359 28,018 Public 1,594 1,247 37 27 8
(13) Novo Nordisk Denmark 904 22,590 Public 1,456 3,132 1,137 35 10
(14) Astrazeneca Great Britain 28,300 30,986 Public 1,366 2,430 682 76 22
(15) Schering Plough USA 18,502 50,000 Public 1,275 1,004 1,243 50 5
(16) Amgen USA 14,771 17,500 Public 847 333 3,139 17 13
(17) CH Boehringer Sohn Germany 14,300 37,723 Private 744 1,437 1,281 47 18
(18) Human Genome Sciences USA 28 770 Public 499 546 0 2 1
(19) Applera USA 2,644 8,210 Private 407 534 72 19 17
(20) Syngeta Switzerland 4,659 13,398 Public 341 591 37 53 15
TABLE A1:












# of patenting 
subsidiaries
(1) IBM USA 91,400 355,766 Public 43,241 14,576 925 198 31
(2) Micron Technology USA 5,688 23,500 Public 13,986 561 128 11 3
(3) Intel USA 37,600 83,900 Public 12,936 2,104 2,291 31 4
(4) Texas Instruments USA 14,300 30,986 Public 12,695 3,212 2,992 24 5
(5) Xerox USA 12,200 20,355 Public 12,636 4,403 3,761 156 3
(6) Hewlett Packard USA 10,400 172,000 Public 9,150 6,798 3,606 151 46
(7) Advanced Micro Devices USA 5,649 10,626 Public 8,466 685 518 17 1
(8) Sun Microsystems USA 13,900 34,200 Public 6,452 2,252 568 46 7
(9) LSI USA 1,982 4,010 Public 3,472 239 6 15 3
(10) Seagate Technology USA 12,700 54,000 Public 3,074 200 56 14 4
(11) Cisco Systems USA 34,900 61,535 Public 2,785 172 6 50 13
(12) Broadcom USA 3,668 5,233 Public 1,781 1,254 115 7 6
(13) Unisys USA 5,230 30,000 Public 1,737 194 67 26 13
(14) Apple Computers USA 24,000 21,600 Public 1,737 288 159 19 2
(15) EMC USA 11,200 31,100 Public 1,274 146 53 64 10
(16) Lexmark USA 5,108 14,900 Public 1,022 100 0 10 1
(17) Dell USA 57,400 82,200 Public 985 10 4 32 8
(18) Imation USA 1,584 2,070 Public 373 95 3 14 2
(19) National Instruments USA 661 4,199 Public 353 3 153 8 1
(20) Diebold USA 2,906 15,451 Public 215 67 1 25 2
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# of patenting 
subsidiaries
(1) Siemens Germany 110,820 427,000 Public 31,999 55,190 4,357 578 101
(2) Motorola USA 15,800 24,568 Public 17,639 5,359 2,462 76 23
(3) Alcatel-Lucent France 19,400 46,096 Public 8,567 7,272 3,659 138 43
(4) AT&T USA 63,100 302,770 Public 5,845 4,999 10 401 12
(5) Nokia Finland 44,800 56,896 Public 3,817 3,597 35 38 11
(6) Ericsson Sweden 2,385 56,055 Public 3,293 6,393 28 63 17
(7) Harris Corp USA 3,500 16,000 Public 1,948 591 3 63 8
(8) Qualcomm USA 11,142 15,400 Public 1,887 2,381 352 16 7
(9) Vodafone Great Britain 55,810 72,375 Public 1,408 1,186 0 5 1
(10) BT Group Great Britain 31,200 108,500 Public 1,074 1,849 213 242 4
(11) France Telecom France 33,900 67,784 Public 543 1,880 2 210 5
(12) ADC Telecommunicatios USA 1,322 9,050 Public 419 95 0 10 2
(13) Verizon Communications USA 88,100 24,200 Public 252 7 15 249 14
(14) Teleflex USA 2,647 19,800 Public 229 32 4 75 16
(15) Qwest Communications USA 13,900 38,000 Public 215 0 0 17 18
(16) Deutsche Telekom Germany 81,300 238,134 Public 171 798 2 231 6
(17) Time Warner USA 44,200 92,700 Public 155 47 15 314 20
(18) 3COM USA 1,300 6,000 Public 155 7 2 15 2
(19) Telefonica Spain 50,700 19,508 Public 22 59 8 160 4
(20) Telecom Italia Italy 41,900 90,129 Public 17 318 2 73 2
TABLE A1:
PANEL E: TOP 10 INNOVATING CORPORATIONS - TELECOMMUNICATIONSUltimate Owner 
Country
Subs Joing by 
Organic Growth
Subs Joined by M&A
Total Group 
Affiliates
Subs Joing by 
Organic Growth




Subs Joing by 
Organic Growth




Austria 218 21 239 803 247 1,050 3,615 337 3,952
(91%) (9%) (76%) (24%) (91%) (9%)
Belgium 298 24 322 3,886 225 4,111 4,874 230 5,104
(93%) (7%) (95%) (5%) (95%) (5%)
Denmark 209 18 227 1,663 143 1,806 3,181 51 3,232
(92%) (8%) (92%) (8%) (98%) (2%)
Finland 170 24 194 644 43 687 728 79 807
(88%) (12%) (94%) (6%) (90%) (10%)
France 1,093 122 1,215 18,376 6,132 24,508 28,176 7,799 35,975
(90%) (10%) (75%) (25%) (78%) (22%)
Germany 1,385 118 1,503 16,068 1,990 18,058 27,659 2,226 29,885
(92%) (8%) (89%) (11%) (93%) (7%)
Great Britain 1,518 142 1,660 16,564 722 17,286 19,288 5,025 24,313
(91%) (9%) (96%) (4%) (79%) (21%)
Greece 1 3 4 1 3 4 - - -
(25%) (75%) (25%) (75%)
Italy 416 38 454 1,374 200 1,574 4,009 720 4,729
(92%) (8%) (87%) (13%) (85%) (15%)
Netherlands 397 39 436 2,518 117 2,635 3,575 298 3,873
(91%) (9%) (96%) (4%) (92%) (8%)
Norway 118 10 128 115 76 191 210 59 269
(92%) (8%) (60%) (40%) (78%) (22%)
Republic of Ireland 34 9 43 144 9 153 174 12 186
(79%) (21%) (94%) (6%) (94%) (6%)
Spain 115 19 134 254 11 265 462 38 500
(86%) (14%) (96%) (4%) (92%) (8%)
Sweden 527 53 580 3,174 347 3,521 12,211 403 12,614
(91%) (9%) (90%) (10%) (97%) (3%)
Switzerland 517 45 562 13,059 2,592 15,651 17,620 170 17,790
(92%) (8%) (83%) (17%) (99%) (1%)
Total Europe 7,016 685 7,701 78,643 12,857 91,500 125,782 17,447 143,229
(91%) (9%) (86%) (14%) (88%) (12%)
United States 4,807 522 5,329 93,728 4,978 98,706 47,117 4,083 51,200
(90%) (10%) (95%) (5%) (92%) (8%)
Total 11,823 1,207 13,030 172,371 17,835 190,206 172,899 21,530 194,429
(91%) (9%) (91%) (9%) (89%) (11%)
Number of Subsidiaries
TABLE A2: 
USPTO Patents EPO Patents






Austria 324 373 295 178 117 992
(33%) (38%) (30%) (18%) (12%)
Belgium 161 3,333 1,524 481 1,043 5,018
(3%) (66%) (30%) (10%) (21%)
Denmark 240 1,439 763 285 478 2,442
(10%) (59%) (31%) (12%) (20%)
Finland 536 4,166 157 123 34 4,859
(11%) (86%) (3%) (3%) (1%)
France 511 3,039 10,992 9,193 1,799 14,542
(4%) (21%) (76%) (63%) (12%)
Germany 7,087 35,379 5,625 1,998 3,627 48,091
(15%) (74%) (12%) (4%) (8%)
Great Britain 1,708 8,614 1,893 1,793 100 12,215
(14%) (71%) (15%) (15%) (1%)
Greece 15 0 0 0 0 15
(100%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%)
Italy 2,280 812 586 168 418 3,678
(62%) (22%) (16%) (5%) (11%)
Netherlands 166 7,136 455 297 158 7,757
(2%) (92%) (6%) (4%) (2%)
Norway 291 117 62 44 18 470
(62%) (25%) (13%) (9%) (4%)
Republic of Ireland 52 44 124 117 7 220
(24%) (20%) (56%) (53%) (3%)
Spain 222 80 129 72 57 431
(52%) (19%) (30%) (17%) (13%)
Sweden 420 1,839 1,272 633 639 3,531
(12%) (52%) (36%) (18%) (18%)
Switzerland 824 6,956 3,412 774 2,638 11,192
(7%) (62%) (30%) (7%) (24%)
Total Europe 14,837 73,327 27,289 16,156 11,133 115,453
(13%) (64%) (24%) (14%) (10%)
United States 75,437 280,464 12,508 10,468 2,040 368,409
(20%) (76%) (3%) (3%) (1%)
Total 90,274 353,791 39,797 26,624 13,173 483,862
(19%) (73%) (8%) (6%) (3%)
TABLE A3:
INNOVATION AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE ACROSS COUNTRIES: USPTO PATENTS GRANTED 


































100% 100% 100% 50%
United StatesBouygues Family
Bouygues Group
14 USPTO / 54 EPO
Alstom
230 USPTO / 391 EPO
COLAS
18 USPTO / 80 EPO
Bouygues Telecom






Power Systems MFG (USA)
53 USPTO / 2 EPO
Alstom Power Hydro














610 USPTO / 279 EPO
Valeo Vision




141 USPTO / 222 EPO
Valeo Thermique Moteur
157 USPTO / 233 epo
Valeo Electronique & Systemes De Liaison
1 USPTO / 32 EPO
Valeo Finance
Valeo Sécurité Habitacle









1,109 USPTO / 740 EPO
Volkswagen
706 USPTO / EPO
Audi
206 USPTO / 893 EPO MAN AG IAV
4 USPTO / 23 EPO
MAN Nutzfahrzeuge
95 USPTO / 505 EPO
MAN Turbo










1 USPTO / 10 EPO
100%
Automobili Lamborghini (Italy)
2 USPTO / 2 EPO
100%
PMD Technologies























714 USPTO / 1860 EPO
Roche Holding
F. Hoffmann-La Roche (Switzerland)
21 USPTO / 2374 EPO
Roche Diagnostics (Germany)
241 USPTO / 1762 EPO
Genentech (USA)
1,048 USPTO / 612 EPO
Chugai Pharmaceutical (Japan)
365 USPTO / 591 EPO
Basilea Pharmaceutica (Switzerland)
23 USPTO / 32 EPO
F. Hoffmann-La Roche (USA)
2,590 USPTO / 2 EPO
BioVeris (USA)
6 USPTO / 22 EPO











1,188 USPTO / 314 EPO
L’Oreal (France)
3,135 USPTO / 115 EPO
Nestec
1,188 USPTO / 314 EPO
Alcon
(Switzerland, USA)
137 USPTO / 18 EPO
La Roche-Posay Laboratoire 
Pharmaceutique (France)
















Fiat Auto Holding (Netherlands)
Magneti Marelli Powertrain




243 USPTO / 784 EPO
Iveco-Magrius














1,920 USTPO / 5,708 EPO
Ericsson (USA)
1,671 USPTO / 640 EPO
Entrisphere (USA)
1 USPTO / 11 EPO
Sony Ericsson
(Sweden)



















53 USPTO / 2 EPO
Color Kinetics (USA)













2 USPTO / 21 EPO
Nokia (USA)








100% 100% 63% 100%
Finland